IP: 30 or more flavors

[David Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

Date: Sun, 01 Jun 1997 19:40:40 -0400
To: farber () central cis upenn edu (David Farber)
From: Jock Gill <jgill () penfield-gill com>
Subject: 30 or more flavors


Dave,


An executive at a Federal agency involved with security issues recently
explained at a not for attribution public meeting - a squirrelly deal if
ever there was one - that the government no longer plans to ask for a
monolithic escrow/recovery system.  It would not work.  The changes from
the 1993 Clipper proposal, which was agreed did not pass the King George
test [the colonials would have rejected it if George had mandated it] are
substantial.


As this knowledgeable person allowed, Clipper was the Bosnia of the crypto
debate.


The current position of at least one of the interested Federal agencies
appears to have evolved to one where any one is free to use, or not use,
any of the 30 plus flavors of escrow/recovery currently on the market.  The
exception is U. S. government workers who would be required to use USG
approved escrow/recovery to insure the ability to abide by the legal
requirements of document record management regulations.  


You might want to ask Scott Armstrong, the investigative reporter, about
what he would think of government records paid for with public monies
encrypted with lost keys and no way of recovery.  Think of your favorite
political 'bad guy' and ask yourself if you want their emails etc
recoverable and readable or should they be able to hide them away for ever.


I think the story of the evolution of Federal Government thinking and
policy development over the last 4 years is remarkably under-reported and
generally mis-understood.  Not to say that the Feds have done such a good
job with their press relations.  Plenty of opportunity, it would seem, for
the press and the USG to get this story told right and widely disseminated.


The question, of course, that begs to be explored is "jointness" - just how
much cooperation and coordination should there be amongst all of the
Federal agencies with respect to Information Warfare and domestic security?
 Should agencies who are currently NOT allowed to participate in domestic
security issues be allowed, under the rubric of "jointness", to now engage
in domestic intelligence operations?


Do we get to use the encryption of our choice at the price of allowing
formerly prohibited agencies engaging in domestic surveillance?  What a deal.




Regards,


Jock
________________________________________________________________________
Jock Gill
Penfield Gill, Inc.
Boston,  MA
jgill () penfield-gill com           
<http://www.penfield-gill.com>


________________________________________________________________________