IP: Notes on the NRC Crypto Report and Briefing

[Dave Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>]

Danny reported this for IP and CDT .. djf




Date: Thu, 30 May 1996 17:49:40 -0400
To: farber () central cis upenn edu
From: <djw () cdt org> (Daniel J. Weitzner)


> From the National Research Council briefing introducing the report
"Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society":


Today in Washington, a blue ribbon panel of experts today released a
comprehensive report on the state of US encryption policy that calls into
question the Administration's current cryptography policy. The 500 page
report, sponsored by the National Research Council (NRC) highlights the
need for strong, reliable encryption to protect individual privacy, provide
security for businesses, and maintain national security.


Among other things, the report describes how the current US encryption
policy is not working, notes that classified information is not relevant to
the policy debate, and outlines the adverse impact export restrictions have
had on the domestic market.  In addition, the study emphasizes that market
forces and user choices, not law enforcement or national security
interests, should drive the development of encryption technologies and the
debate over US cryptography policy.


The report, entitled "Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information
Society", provides an important starting point for an honest and open
debate on this critical issue. A summary of the report's most important
findings and an overview of its policy recommendations is included below.


OVERVIEW OF SOME OF THE REPORT'S MOST IMPORTANT FINDINGS
--------------------------------------------------------


For the past 3 years, the US government has attempted to leverage the need
for strong encryption and the desire of US businesses to export strong
privacy and security products as a means impose key-escrow encryption. The
result of this has been a policy morass which has stifled innovation,
limited the availability of strong, easy to use encryption technologies,
and endangered the ability of US companies to compete in the global
information marketplace.


While acknowledging the complexities and challenges associated with the
encryption policy debate, the study's findings directly undermine the
Administration's current approach to cryptography policy. The report
concludes by noting, that the "Widespread commercial and private use of
cryptography in the United States and abroad is inevitable in the long run
and that its advantages, on balance, outweigh its disadvantages.  The
committee concluded that the overall interests of the government and the
nation would best be served by a policy that fosters a judicious transition
toward the broad use of cryptography."


The NRC study identified several critical issues:


* CURRENT US ENCRYPTION POLICY IS NOT WORKING:  The study is highly
  critical of the current ad-hoc approach to US encryption policy,
  particularly the reliance on export controls. The study states
  explicitly, "Current national cryptography policy is not adequate to
  support the information security requirements of an information
  society."


  The study goes on to note, "Indeed, current policy discourages the use
  of cryptography, whether intentionally or not, and in so doing impedes
  the ability of the nation to use cryptographic tools that would help
  to remediate certain important vulnerabilities.  For example, through
  the use of export controls, national policy has explicitly sought to
  limit the use of encryption abroad but has also had the effect of
  reducing the domestic availability to businesses and other users of
  products with strong encryption capabilities."


* CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE POLICY DEBATE: The NRC
  report explicitly states that classified information is "not
  particularly relevant" to the policy debate. The study states, "The
  debate over national cryptography policy can be carried out in a
  reasonable manner on an unclassified basis."  The study goes on to
  note, "Although many of the details relevant to policy makers are
  necessarily classified, these details are not central to making policy
  arguments one way or another. Classified material, while important to
  operational matters in specific cases, is neither essential to the big
  picture or why policy has the shape and texture that it does today nor
  required for the general outline of how technology will, and why
  policy should, evolve in the future."


  This is a startling revelation which will profoundly alter the
  encryption policy debate.  No longer can the government claim, "If you
  knew what we knew, you would understand this issue." It also suggests
  that, while national security and law enforcement interests are an
  important element in the  debate, there is no "secret-silver-bullet"
  which trumps all other considerations.


  From now on, the debate over cryptography policy should occur in the
  open, with all issues aired publicly.  By removing its arguments from
  the veil of secrecy, the government can go a long way towards building
  the trust of the public.


* EXPORT CONTROLS DO INFLUENCE THE DOMESTIC MARKET AND HARM
  COMPETITIVENESS OF US INDUSTRY: The NRC study confirms
  what civil liberties advocates and the computer industry have long
  argued: that the current administration policy of limiting the export
  of strong encryption is impacting the domestic market and harming US
  business.


  The study states, "Export controls also have had the effect of
  reducing the domestic availability of products with strong encryption
  capabilities... Thus, domestic users face a more limited range of
  options for strong encryption than they would in the absence of
  export controls."


* MARKET FORCES, NOT GOVERNMENT INTERESTS, SHOULD DRIVE THE POLICY
  DEBATE: The study stresses that the domestic availability of
  encryption should not be restricted in any way, and that the market of
  individual users, rather than the government's interests, should drive
  the development of technology and policy.


  The study notes, "As cryptography has assumed a greater importance to
  non government interests, national cryptography policy has become
  increasingly disconnected from market reality and the needs of parties
  in the private sector ... A national cryptography policy that is
  aligned with market forces would emphasize the freedom of domestic
  users to determine cryptographic functionality, protections, and
  implementations according to their security needs as they see fit."


The study is without a doubt the most comprehensive and balanced analysis
of the complex encryption policy debate yet published.
While stressing the need for strong encryption to protect individual
privacy, maintain the competitiveness of US industry in the global
marketplace, the report also acknowledges the real challenges posed to law
enforcement and national security by the global proliferation of strong
encryption technologies. The authors of the study deserve great credit for
their work in producing what will clearly become the basis for an open and
honest public debate over the need to reform US encryption policy.


******


A complete analysis of the report will be posted on the Center for
Democracy and Technology's web site at <http://www.cdt.org/crypto>.


Information on how to obtain a copy of the document is available at
<http://www2.nas.edu/cstbweb/>.


******








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