Re: Australia's proposed crypto policy (Denning/Orlowski,

[David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>]

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Date: Sat, 26 Aug 1995 12:02:07 +0100
From: Ross.Anderson () cl cam ac uk
Subject: Re: Australia's proposed crypto policy (Denning/Orlowski, RISKS-17.29)


> Ross Anderson posted a message on the net recently stating that Australia
> was proposing an encryption policy that would force residents to use weak
> cryptography while banks would get key escrow.


Dorothy Denning goes on to say that I misinterpreted Mr Orlowski; that he
`is not proposing that individuals be forced to use weak encryption'.
Well, Orlowski is now wriggling like a lawyer, but I was there at the
conference, and on the panel with him afterwards. His paper states that


    `the needs of the majority of users of the infrastructure for privacy
     and smaller financial transactions can be met by lower level
     encryption'
and
    `Given that a large proportion of the population would not be using
     the higher level encryption products, application of key escrow for
     such products is less likely to create the type of adverse reaction
     seen to date. Government agencies and large financial institutions are
     more likely to accept the need for key escrow in the type of products
     which they use'
and
    `As mentioned earlier, I see encryption being utilised on two levels, a
     general level being used by the majority of users and a more
     sophisticated level with much more limited use. Intercepted messages
     under the first level may be able to be decrypted by the various
     interception authorities.


    `The second level would probably, however, require more sophisticated
     techniques in circumstances where the key cannot, for whatever reason,
     be recovered from escrow. This may be achieved by the establishment of
     a central decrypting unit which would receive, decrypt and transmit back
     messages'


He stated at this point, in a verbal aside, that the AG's department
considered itself the proper repository for this `central decrypting unit'.
As I summarised it in my original post to risks:


> 40 bit keys for the masses, 56-bit escrowed keys for the banks, and a
> Wiener machine sitting in Orlowski's office. Belt, braces and string.


Orlowski does phrase his comments as advocacy rather than prescription, and
he does have a disclaimer saying that these are his personal views, not
those of the Australian government.


But it emerged in the subsequent discussions that the paper did not really
represent his personal views at all. Not only was he unable to defend them
with any vigour during the panel, but he admitted that he had been told to
float the policy by his boss, who didn't want to appear himself out of fear
of the sort of fuss which greeted the Clipper chip in the USA, and the last
attempt to introduce ID cards in Australia. With a general election due, the
Keating government is vulnerable, and this clearly limits their spooks'
freedom of action.


Risks readers might like to know that the usual suspects - John Rogers from
the Australian Defence Signals Directorate and Mark King from GCHQ - were
prominent in the audience. King arrived on the same plane as me; he flew
business class and went off to a posh downtown hotel. I doubt that GCHQ paid
for all that out of idle curiosity.


Orlowski's article also states


    "Debate on these issues should be limited to the appropriate
     parties rather than widely promulgated on the network."


Curiously, I was not able to post to usenet while I was in Australia --
nobody at Queensland University of Technology was, and their sysprogs
couldn't find the fault. (Is this a RISK of playing host to someone involved
in the crypto policy debate?) Anyway, once I got back to the UK, I brought
Orlowski's proposals to public attention - and this has led to precisely the
fuss which Canberra was clearly trying to avoid.


Finally, Orlowski did not even get the URL of his paper right in the letter
which Dorothy posted to this group. It is actually to be found at


http://commerce.anu.edu.au/comm/staff/RogerC/Info_Infrastructure/Orlowski.html


Ross