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OTHER APPROACHES TO CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION: THE CHINESE AND
From: David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 1995 00:13:09 -0400
U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Washington, DC 20510 * * OTHER APPROACHES TO CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION: THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE ARMS INDUSTRIES * The OTA background paper "Other Approaches to Civil-Military Integration: The Chinese and Japanese Arms Industries" is now available. Ordering information and details about electronic access are at the end of this file. * OTA EXAMINES CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION IN BOTH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND JAPAN * The integration of defense and commercial technology and industry--often termed civil-military integration (CMI)--is one way to preserve the U.S. defense capability in the face of budget reductions. Under CMI, common technologies, processes, labor, equipment, material, and/or facilities are used to meet both defense and commercial needs. A background paper released today by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) examines how the People's Republic of China and Japan, two countries with sizable defense industries, have succeeded in achieving significant levels of CMI. It supplements the full report, "Assessing the Potential for Civil-Military Integration," published in September 1994. In that report, OTA found that successful implementation of CMI in the United States requires a long-term commitment. It involves careful design and planning of systems, components, and subcomponents, and extends to all tiers and throughout the planning and production process. Potential benefits are significant, but will take time to accrue. Patience and a steady effort are, therefore, paramount requirements for successful CMI. CMI efforts on the part of Japan and the People's Republic of China are of interest because the two countries have significant military-industrial capabilities in a region that is of growing global economic importance. Both countries have integrated their civil and military technological infrastructures to various degrees. Contrary to some claims, differences between the Japanese and American (and Chinese and American) military, political, and economic situations greatly limit the potential for direct application of Asian experiences to the American situation. Nonetheless, some important lessons can be learned-- especially from the Japanese experience. For example, the reduced use of military specifications and standards that have marked the American defense technology and industrial base suggests that a reliance on high-quality production from the commercial sector is possible. The Asian cases also suggest that greater integration of the research and development, and manufacturing of defense and commercial goods is possible. In particular, says OTA, the more fundamental the technology, the easier it is to integrate. In addition, the Japanese experience reinforces the observation that it is easier to integrate the manufacturing of components and subcomponents (e.g., composites and computer chips) than it is to integrate the assembly of entire systems (e.g., commercial and high- performance aircraft). Along these lines, too, the more basic processes may be more amenable to integration. This involves not only the production of components, but also their initial design. The Japanese case suggests that there are many component technologies and processes that are not truly unique, says OTA. As seen in Japan and the PRC, regardless of the level of technological sophistication, many technologies, particularly those at the lower tiers, have dual use potential. Too often, militarily unique technologies are cited as a reason for military specifications, considered necessary for their production. Both Asian cases indicate that CMI is not cost-free. The political, economic, social and historical contexts of the American and Asian cases are very different. It is therefore unlikely that the American system would support the ambiguity inherent in the commercial use of public facilities and, more importantly, of public resources. OTA is a nonpartisan analytical agency that serves the U.S. Congress. Its purpose is to aid Congress with the complex and often highly technical issues that increasingly affect our society. For copies of the 52-page background paper "Other Approaches to Civil-Military Integration: The Chinese and Japanese Arms Industries" for congressional use, please call (202) 224- 9241. Copies for noncongressional use are available from the Superintendent of Documents for $3.75 each. To order, call (202) 512-0132 (GPO's main bookstore) or (202) 512-1800 and indicate stock GPO stock number number 052-003-01408-4. Or send your check for $3.75 a copy or provide your VISA or MasterCard number and expiration date to: Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA, 15250-7974, [FAX (202) 512-2250]. Federal Express service is available for an additional $8.50 per order. Readers can access the background paper and the report electronically through OTA Online via the following standard Internet tools: WWW: http://www.ota.gov FTP: otabbs.ota.gov; login as anonymous, password is your e-mail address; the background paper is in the /pub/civmil.asia directory and the full report is in the /pub/civil.military.integration directory Telnet: otabbs.ota.gov; login as public, password is public Additional features of OTA Online are available through client software with a graphical user interface for Microsoft Windows. This software is available free through the WWW home page or by contacting the OTA Telecommunications and Information Systems Office, (202) 228-6000, or email sysop () ota gov Direct questions or comments on Internet services by email to netsupport () ota gov The electronic file names and sizes are: 01README.TXT (2K) CH1A.TXT (65K) CH1B.TXT (76K) FOREWORD.TXT (3K) ORDER.INFO.TXT (4K) PREFACE.TXT (6K) REVIEWER.TXT (1K) STAFF.TXT (1K) TOC.TXT (1K)
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