More boots are dropping; Denning suggests banning non-escrowed

[David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>]

Subject: More boots are dropping; Denning suggests banning non-escrowed crypto
From: Shabbir J. Safdar, shabbir () panix com
Date: 1 Nov 1994 09:01:50 -0500
In article <395hoe$phf () panix3 panix com> Shabbir J. Safdar,
shabbir () panix com writes:
>                       Wiretap Watch - post-bill note
>                               November 1, 1994
>                  Distribute Widely - (until November 30, 1994)
>
>               Dr. Denning sees restrictions on non-escrowed crypto
>                  as an obvious possibility if Clipper sinks
>
>
> I attended the NYU Law School symposium on "rights in cyberspace"
> last Friday (Oct. 27, 1994) here in New York.  There were three panels.
> On the mid afternoon panel, the topic was regulating state access to
> encrypted communications.
>
> Panelists included Oliver Smoot (attribution forgotten), Dr. Dorothy
> Denning (famous key escrow proponent), Steven Cherry (Voters Telecomm
> Watch spokesperson), and J Beckwith Burr (who was not a rep of the EFF,
> but gave a synopsis of their position).
>
> Dr. Denning gave a chillingly calm description of key escrow, and then
> the panelists as a whole answered questions.  At one point the subject
> arose of just how "voluntary" Clipper really could be, seeing as the
> public and industry had overwhelmingly rejected it.  Who will use a
> voluntary standard that nobody likes?
>
> The consensus of the key-escrow opponents on the panel seemed to be "nobody".
>
> Dr. Denning, speaking for herself and not as a spokesperson for the
> Administration, stated that if alternate non-escrowed encryption became
> prevalent, the next step would be to implement "restrictions" on non-
> escrowed technology.
>
> I think its safe to assume that Dr. Denning wasn't speaking of secret
> plot to ban private crypto; she was just commenting on the obvious:
>
> The Administration & Law Enforcement wants access to *all*
> communications.  While they'll play "nice" now, they won't be so nice if
> you don't go along with them.  It's going to get ugly down the road, and
> HR 5199 could be the panacea.
>
> What can you do?
>
> -Get to know your legislator.
> Just as the DT bill was railroaded through, there may not be a big
> chance of stopping 5199, a bill that could put into legislation the
> govt's key escrow program, making it a NIST standard.  You must
> convince your legislator that a little privacy is a good thing.  Non-
> escrowed crypto will not bring back all the privacy you've lost in the
> last 50 years.  It will bring back some.  Some is better than none, and
> it maintains the balance between law enforcement interests and privacy
> concerns.
>
> Learn who your legislators are.  Put their phone numbers on a scrap of
> paper and keep them in your wallet or purse.  This will encourage you to
> call next session during one of the crucial moments.
>
> -Save your money.
> There are a lot of organizations around that you can join that will
> represent your interests in Congress.  Consider whether you should instead
> save your money and give it directly to a legislator with a good record
> on privacy and cryptography.  Several such legislators were recently
> identified in the VTW (Voters Telecomm Watch) 1993/1994 Report Card.
>
> -Join the VTW announcements mailing list.
> Send mail to vtw () vtw org and ask to be subscribed to vtw-announce.
> We will be carefully tracking HR 5199 next session with the same frenetic
> precision we applied to Rep. Maria Cantwell's Cryptography Exports bill
> and the FBI's Wiretap/Digital Telephony bill.
>
>
> Thanks,
> -Shabbir