Re: Clipper

[David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>]

From: jim () rand org (Jim Gillogly)
Subject: Re: Clipper
Date: 9 Feb 1994 22:24:09 GMT
Organization: Banzai Institute


In article <2j667q$4f8 () delphinium cig mot com>,
John J. Reego <reego () rtsg mot com> wrote:
> Even if an escrow agency wasn't holding on to a key
> that could be used to decrypt your data - would you still
> want to use the Clipper chip?


I'd trust it even less if there were no escrow, assuming the specs were
still classified.  My reasoning:  NSA has a mandate to read mail, and
making available a "standard" that cut them out of the loop for a long
time would be acting against that mandate.  Given that there's a gaping
front door to the system with large signposts pointing toward it, there's
no <point> to having a back door: the victims know that it's wide open, so
they won't hide anything in it that they don't want the goons guarding at
the door to have access to -- to strain the metaphor a bit closer to its
breaking point.


We don't have to formulate a complicated conspiracy theory regarding
Skipjack: the motives are clear and consistent and on the table.  Any
concentration on hidden holes in Skipjack is irrelevant (whether justified
or not), since the primary skulduggery is going on right out in the open.
Of course, I still don't understand the whole concept, like why the
existence of Clipper would make bad guys less likely to use strong
encryption...


I like the .sig somebody's using: "Clipper/EES: privacy for people who have
nothing to hide".

--
        Jim Gillogly
        Sterday, 19 Solmath S.R. 1994, 22:24