"so how long before the other shoe drops?"

[David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>]

Law professor Dan Burk of George Macon U. contributes this to the cyberia
mailing list:




I guess that I'll need to review DOJ's mumbo-jumbo more carefully, but
I was under the impression that the feds would supposedly obtain the
encryption keys from the escrow agents *after* they had a warrant in
hand (thus satisfying Trotter's "neutral magistrate" requirement -- in
theory).


Even assuming that the plan calls for judicial review sufficient to
meet separation of powers/4th amendment requirements, it is just as
disturbing as ever:


1) The escrow "agents" are executive branch federal agencies with no
incentive to consider the interests of the accused or even to seriously
review whether a warrant has properly issued, and,


2) DOJ's disclaimer that the escrow plan creates no substantive right
strongly suggests that they fully expect the plan will be misused/abused.


3) The administration doth protest too much that adherence to the escrow
standard is "voluntary."  It does the law enforcement agencies no good
to have this standard unless other encryption methods are unavailable --
so how long before the other shoe drops?


Dan
dburk () gmuvax gmu edu