A bit more on Clipper from FOIA

[gnu () cygnus com <gnu () cygnus com>]

The FOIA suits that Lee Tien and I filed re Clipper are starting to bear
fruit.  Lee, thanks for forwarding this material.

The 20? Apr 1993 memorandum for the acting asst secry defense says,
paragraph 2, "The law enforcement and national security communities
... propose that cryptography be made available AND REQUIRED which
contains a ``trapdoor'' that would allow law enforcement and national
security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered
communications." (emphasis mine)

Also note that it says, bottom of 2nd page, "The President has also
directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access
to the keys will not be concealed from the public.  National security
officials are not mentioned."

Other documents from NIST reveal:

        Can NSA read mesasge encrypted with this device?

        It is not our policy to comment on our analytic capability.


        Will NSA have access to the keys?

        NSA could seek access to the keys only if it can satisfy the
        key holders that it needs access to carry out its foreign
        intelligence mission and that the surveillance is lawful and
        authorized.  Because NSA's mission is limited to the
        collection of foreign intelligence, we believe the
        likelihood NSA will seek access to escrowed key [sic] is remote.

In short, NSA will not say whether they can read encrypted data,
but it is unlikely that they will try to get acces to escrowed keys
to do so.

Also:

        Functions specified by NSA; logic designed by
        MYKOTRONX; chip fabricated by VLSI, Inc.: manufactured 
        chip programmed (made unique) by MYKOTRONX to security
        equipment manufacturers willing to follow proper
        security procedures for handling and storage of the
        programmed chip; equipment sold to customers;

This confirms a suspicion Whit Diffie had, based on the CCEP, that not
everyone will be able to get the chips, only companies that agree to
(secret) conditions on how they use them.

Lee,

Please scan in the documents from the office of the asst secretary of
defense, into ASCII.

Please also appeal their denial of portions of the documents.  Also
indicate that not all responsive documents may not have been provided,
since the released documents refer to others under the control of the
office of the asst. secry. of defense (e.g. in the May 3 "Executive
Summary", paragraph 1: "In response to DEPSECDEF's tasking of 21 Apr
93 (TAB A) information is provided."  We don't have a copy of the
tasking in TAB A.

Also, a memo from Daniel J. Ryan contains "Comments on PRD-27/NSA
Draft", and refers to "your proposed memorandum to Jim Lweis,
Department of State".  We do not have either that draft or the
proposed memorandum.

The Dan Ryan and Ray Pollari memos say, "The President has also directed
that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys
will not be concealed from the public."  We do not have a copy of this
directive from the President.

The justification for appealing the denied material is that, as the
released documents themselves indicate, "A full-scale public debate is
needed to ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their
privacy and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the
expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of
law enforcement and national security personnel.  It is not clear what
the public will decide."  We obviously cannot have a full-scale debate
without a full public airing of all parties' concerns.  For example,
the denied paragraph in Ray Pollari's memo is immediately followed by
"Despite these concerns, ...".  The public interest in knowing all
sides of the issue, as the citizenry makes a decision that will have a
long-lasting impact on personal privacy, national security, and
orderly enforcement of laws, overrides the government's desire to keep
its concerns secret from the public.  Documents classified under Cold
War secrecy laws should not hide the government's legitimate national
security concerns from this public decision-making process, when the
issues being decided are of this magnitude.

The copies that I got of this material have off-center xeroxing that
is missing words in the right hand margin of the page mentioned above,
and in the left margin of the last page (signed by Ray Pollari).  If
this is just a defect in your xeroxing them for me, please send me
better ones; if it's in the originals you have, please ask them in the
appeal to provide better originals.

        John