Re: [logs] nimda web server logs

["Jay D. Dyson" <jdyson () treachery net>]

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On Tue, 11 Jun 2002, Sweth Chandramouli wrote:

> > Here's what I'm seeing -- anyone have any information on this variant?
> > /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\\*.cif/s/b
> > /a.asp/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../winnt/repair/sam
> > /a.asp/..%c1%9c../..%c1%9c../winnt/repair/sam
> >
> > This is definitely not Nimda, although it attempts to exploit the same 
> > directory traversal vulnerability in IIS as Nimda
>
> Perhaps this should be thrown over to the incidents list?

        I concur.  Incidents folks, here's a summary of the present
discussion from the Log Analysis list.

        1.      Tina Bird requested a list of Nimda variant attack strings
                (which I provided).  Upon review, she determined that the
                style of attacks she was seeing (enumerated at the top of
                this message) were not among the known Nimda variants.

        2.      Michael Katz made the observation that the directory
                traversal technique is the same as Nimda, though the 
                attacks don't appear as a Nimda variant.  Mr. Katz
                further suggested that the attacks may have been manually
                executed.

        3.      Sweth Chandramouli commented on the '.cif' request thus:
                "This is the one that scares me; it's attempting to run a
                recursive directory search on your C drive to find your 
                Internet Explorer component information file--the file
                that, for example, Windows Update uses to determine what
                patches you have installed.  Presumably, if that request
                succeeded, it would then download the CIF to find out what 
                version of IE you have, etc., and try only those exploits
                of relevance."

        4.      Both Sweth and myself noted that the traversal to /winnt/
                repair/sam had some large ramifications if the file access
                attempt wasn't hung up with some sort of Microsoft access
                sharing violation.  (The attacker would basically have a
                load of goodies to feed l0phtcrack.)

        Anyone else seeing this pop up in their logs?  Any honeypots
collecting data of this sort?  It's a new one on me.

- -Jay

  (    (                                                          _______
  ))   ))   .--"There's always time for a good cup of coffee"--.   >====<--.
C|~~|C|~~| (>------ Jay D. Dyson -- jdyson () treachery net ------<) |    = |-'
 `--' `--'  `-- I'll be diplomatic...when I run out of ammo. --'  `------'

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