HoneyTokens

[Lance Spitzner <lance () honeynet org>]

For those of you who are not on the IDS list, very interesting
thread coming up, honeytokens.  Resources (such as word
documents, excel spreadsheets, webpages) that no one should
be touching.  Same concept as honeypots, but you are applying
it to individuals items (hence the term tokens).

Used primarily for detection (and thus why it started on
the IDS list).  However, since the concept is based on
honeypots, wanted to forward to you folks :)

lance

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2003 11:17:46 -0000
From: Augusto Paes de Barros <augusto () paesdebarros com br>
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots

Lance's point can be expanded in very interesting views. Why use only
honeypots "hosts" or "nets", when whe can use accounts, documents, info,
etc? I was developing an idea that I call "honeytokens", to use on Windows
networks. Basically, information that shouldn't be flowing over the network
and, if you can detect it, something wrong is happening.

--
Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP
http://www.paesdebarros.com.br
augusto () paesdebarros com br



-----Mensagem original-----
De: Lance Spitzner [mailto:lance () honeynet org]
To: Focus on Intrusion Detection Systems; slyph () alum mit edu
Subject: Re: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots


On Wed, 19 Feb 2003, Robert Graham wrote:

> People have been hoping that there is some sort of magic-pill 
> technology that solves the problem of IDS. "Protocol-anomaly 
> detection" is one of those buzzwords that promises a magic pill.

Okay, I'll admit, to me alot of the security problems I see are nothing
more then nails, and honeypots are the hammer.  However, seriously, have
folks considered the detection capabilities of honeypots?  The reason I 
bring this up in this thread, is for honeypots, everything is an anamoly.  
The concept of a honeypot is it has no production or authorized activity.
Everything it captures its way is most likely malicious activity.  Not
only that, but you dramaticaly reduce 'noise'.  Instead of dealing with
5,000 alerts a day (not that high of a number for many organizations) a
honeypot in the same environment could only generate 5 or 10 alerts a 
day, alerts you most likely need to take action on.  These small data 
sets can make it far easier and cost effective to identify and act on
unauthorized activity.

I'm in no way suggesting that honeypots replace any existing detection
technologies, I'm suggesting that can contribute.  Personally, I feel
the concept of deception has overshadowed the value of honeypots, when
one of their true values lies in detection.

lance