funsec mailing list archives

Re: Fwd: [Dataloss] Network Solutions was PCI compliant before breach


From: Michael Graham <jmgraham () gmail com>
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 17:45:04 -0400

On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 4:47 PM, <chris () blask org> wrote:

I still think PCI is fine for what it is, but confusing it with "all I need to do to secure myself" is the problem.  
What the DSS is is a least-common-denominator of some of the things that should be done, as could be agreed to by a 
committee of lawyers.  As far as that goes it is correct: you should in fact have a firewall, configure it, separate 
data....  But thinking that achieving PCI compliance is all anyone needs to do - particularly, as you say, in large 
shops - is rank madness.

I'll take them at their word that they passed a PCI audit, the SSC will be extremely cranky with them if they say 
they did when they didn't.  But I would want them to have at least setup serious monitoring of traffic (as is not 
required by PCI) and preferably application behavior if at all possible, too - which is highly unlikely what they did.

I'm thinking you could argue that the DSS actually makes things worse by lulling folks into a false sense of 
security, but I'm willing to be that these same folks would have done no more (and maybe less) without it...

-chris


This is essentially exactly what annoys me about PCI as it's often
thrown around these days.  It's difficult to find companies that need
to be PCI compliant that are running real, serious internal risk
management programs to make their own decisions about risk and
avoidance/mitigation.  Instead they have a lowest common denominator
to apply and after that well it's not their problem.  The mentality is
obvious in the companies that suffer breaches and immediately blurt
out "We were PCI compliant!"  As if that's a defense against the
rudeness of reality.

Obviously, meeting an arbitrary metric shouldn't absolve you of the
responsibility to make your own risk decisions as appropriate to your
business and your customers, and after having done so it doesn't
absolve you of the responsibility to execute those risk decisions
properly.  Compound this absurd notion that PCI compliance divests you
of core custodian responsibilities with the questionable value of PCI
itself and we've got the PCI council helping all of us into an overall
worse security situation, not a better one, regardless of intent.

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