CSRF and stored XSS in WordPress Content Slide allow an attacker to have full admin privileges (WordPress plugin)

[dxw Security <security () dxw com>]

Details
================
Software: Wordpress Content Slide
Version: 1.4.2
Homepage: http://wordpress.org/plugins/content-slide/
Advisory report: 
https://security.dxw.com/advisories/csrf-and-stored-xss-in-wordpress-content-slide-allow-an-attacker-to-have-full-admin-privileges/
CVE: Awaiting assignment
CVSS: 6.8 (Medium; AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P)

Description
================
CSRF and stored XSS in WordPress Content Slide allow an attacker to have full admin privileges

Vulnerability
================
An attacker able to convince an admin to visit a link of their choosing is able to execute arbitrary javascript:
A CSRF vulnerability allows an attacker to change any option in the plugin. The plugin does not escape content when put 
into HTML so the attacker can then use JavaScript to perform almost any action an admin can take (including creating 
new users, executing arbitrary php through the theme editor or exploiting vulnerabilities in WordPress or other plugins 
which normally require the user to be authenticated as an admin).

Proof of concept
================
While logged into a site with the plugin enabled open a page containing the following form and click the submit button 
(in a real attack the form could be made to auto-submit):
<form action=\"http://localhost/wp-admin/admin.php?page=content-slide/content_slide.php\"; method=\"POST\">
  <input type=\"text\" name=\"wpcs_options[no_of_custom_images]\" value=\"1\">
  <input type=\"text\" name=\"wpcs_options[slide_image1]\" value=\"&quot;>&lt;script>alert(1)&lt;/script>\">
  <input type=\"submit\">
</form>
If using a browser without reflected XSS mitigation (e.g. Chrome) the admin user will see “1” in an alert box, 
otherwise a refresh of the page is required before the JavaScript is executed.

Mitigations
================
Disable the plugin until a new version is released that fixes this bug
At the time of publishing no fix is available and the plugin has been removed from the plugin directory

Disclosure policy
================
dxw believes in responsible disclosure. Your attention is drawn to our disclosure policy: 
https://security.dxw.com/disclosure/

Please contact us on security () dxw com to acknowledge this report if you received it via a third party (for example, 
plugins () wordpress org) as they generally cannot communicate with us on your behalf.

This vulnerability will be published if we do not receive a response to this report with 14 days.

Timeline
================

2014-10-08: Discovered
2014-12-16: Reported to vendor via email form at http://www.snilesh.com/contact-me/
2014-12-16: Requested CVE
2015-01-07: Vendor responded
2015-01-09: Vendor chased
2015-04-09: Vendor had given assurances that a fix would be available, and was given multiple extensions to do so, but 
by this point they had stopped responding. Emailed plugins () wordpress org requesting a takedown.
2015-04-16: Confirmed that the plugin is no longer on the directory. Published.



Discovered by dxw:
================
Tom Adams
Please visit security.dxw.com for more information.
          


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