Re: PoC: End-to-end correlation for Tor connections using an active timing attack

[coderman <coderman () gmail com>]

On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 1:06 PM, Jann Horn <jann () thejh net> wrote:
> This is a very simple implementation of an active timing attack on Tor. Please note that
> the Tor developers are aware of issues like this -
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough states:...

interesting work; and a good example of the limits of traffic analysis
protection in low latency, stream oriented protocols.

an even more effective approach is using active DoS as a signal for
confirmation, like your sequence of activity:

"Denial of Service or Denial of Security? How Attacks on Reliability
can Compromise Anonymity"
  http://hostmaster.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ccs07-doa.pdf




> So, this is a known problem, but I wanted to see how easy it really is to do this,
> and I wanted to try it myself, so I built a PoC.
>
> The requirements are:
>  - The user points his browser to an attacker's webserver and stays on that server
>    long enough (a bit over 4 minutes in my implementation)

one other trick, try hosting the webserver on a common "long lived
port".  not sure if this will make much difference, but it should
improve the odds of your entire few minute sequence staying on the
same circuit...


best regards,

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