Re: keybase.io

[Jonathan Care <jonc () tardis org>]

On 23 June 2014 00:58, Tony Arcieri <bascule () gmail com> wrote:

> On Sat, Jun 21, 2014 at 1:37 PM, Robert Dannhauer <
> r.dannhauer () googlemail com> wrote:
>
> > The only question: Can this be trusted? Can we make sure they don't know
> > the passphrase?
>
>
> No, the passphrase is being entered into a web page loaded from their
> domain. Unless you audit the scripts every single time you load the page,
> they (or anyone with access to their servers, or anyone able to pull off an
> XSS attack) could easily inject a keylogger or other mechanism for
> recovering the password.

While this is true, I think that keybase.io is providing something that is
arguably better than nothing, and they do make a point of saying that their
command line tools remove the web horribles that we are all aware of.

PGP/GPG has a horrible history of not being adopted. It's seen as hard to
use, elitist, and therefore something to be evaded by the general computing
populace (if they are even aware of it!) Projects like keybase.io,
mailvelope, and so on give some assurance of privacy, depending on one's
threat model. It's not perfect, but its still Pretty Good.

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