Re: Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]

[Jeffrey Walton <noloader () gmail com>]

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 1:03 AM, coderman <coderman () gmail com> wrote:
> regarding the inability for NSA employees to report ethical violations
> in a manner that did not assure retribution:
>
> this is actually a somewhat difficult anonymity / privacy question in
> the context of highly compartmented information and operations, where
> knowledge of a subset of specific details is sufficient to imply
> strong suspicion and scrutiny to a very small number of individuals...
>
> ... assuming you don't circumvent the apparently mediocre constraints
> to this information in the information systems that contain it. ;)
Just ask Bill Binney how well that system worked at the NSA, or
Jessica Radack at Department of Justice, or....

> while academically interesting, in all practical terms we should
> render this question moot and provide absolute communication
> origin[0], destination[1], and content[2] privacy to all network users
> in all locations under all circumstances guaranteed by constitutional
> law, prosecutorial discretion, and practical realities...
The US Constitution makes no guarantee of the right to privacy. (I
seem to recall the US Supreme Court recognized it as a construction of
two other amendments back in 1860s, but I can't find the reference).
Even if the right to privacy was recognized, it would only apply to
government. Corporate would be free to spy on us and then sell it to
the government.

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