Re: tor vulnerabilities?

[Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu]

On Wed, 03 Jul 2013 10:54:09 -0500, Michael T said:

> What about keysigning among tor operators?  I trust top_op1, and he trusts
> top_op2, 3, and 4, so I can trust them as well.

Chunk it through - if you make keysigning mandatory, you're probably going
to see a drop from the current 4,000 or so relays down to maybe 500 or so.
At which point it becomes *easier* for a group to subvert enough servers
to deanonymize people.

And how do you get a new Tor relay set up if a key signing is mandatory?

There's also a more subtle problem. A PGP-style web-of-trust doesn't say
anything about whether you should actually trust the *content* of signed data
as far as content goes, only that it's from the signature it claims to be.  So
if you sign my Tor key, what are you *actually* attesting to?  Only the fact
that I run a Tor relay or three.  You aren't actually saying anything about
whether or not I'm part of the cabal trying to take over Tor.

So unless signing a key includes an attestation/verification that the key
you're signing isn't for a server that's part of the cabal (and how would
you verify that before you sign?), the key signing doesn't actually add any
real security.

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