Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: Vulnerability in FortiClient SSL VPN - Linux


From: magikh0e <magikh0e () ihtb org>
Date: Mon, 30 May 2011 14:11:27 -0400

Yep ;) I was a bit surprised about how they went out of the way to
create the existence of this one. This problem was solved in mkstemp
with the release of glibc 2.0.7. That was released May 22 1998...

Just in case they stumble upon this thread or for others that do not yet
understand this...
 
FIO03-J. Remove temporary files before termination
https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/FIO03-J.+Remove+temporary+files+before+termination

FIO00-J. Do not operate on files in shared directories 
https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/FIO00-J.+Do
+not+operate+on+files+in+shared+directories

FIO01-J. Create files with appropriate access permissions
https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/FIO01-J.+Create+files+with+appropriate+access+permissions



On Mon, 2011-05-30 at 09:13 -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu wrote:
On Sun, 29 May 2011 18:47:28 EDT, magikh0e said:

Create a symlink from /tmp/forticlientsslvpn.lock
to /some/file/owned_by_root as a non-root user. Then run the
forticlientsslvpn client as root and the file you pointed at will then
be overwritten upon execution.

Gaah.  People are *still* getting this one wrong?  I mean, hasn't
the problem of /tmp races been here since at least V6 if not
earlier? So this problem has been here longer than most of the
readers of this list.  And proper solutions have been around for
at least 2 decades or so, as well.

Makes one wonder what *else* they got wrong.  Gotta worry when
bozos write security-sensitive software...


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