Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC
From: Michele Orru <antisnatchor () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 17:55:36 +0100
2011/2/14 MustLive <mustlive () websecurity com ua>:
Hello Michele! Few days ago I saw your advisory about Drupal's captcha. It's interesting advisory, but I have one note concerning it - your research is very close to mine ;-) (it concerns similar holes which I found before you).
I didn't found anything in FD or other public lists mentioning this issue before, so.... :)
First, you are talking Drupal captcha and saying that Drupal <= 6.20 are vulnerable. But it's not fully correct - Drupal Captcha module it's not core module, but third party one, so these holes have no relation to Drupal. It's how Drupal developers answered me in December, when I informed them about holes in their Captcha (I'm not using Drupal, so I didn't know is core this module or not). And so the hole in captcha concerns only Captcha module for Drupal (and sites on any version of Drupal with such module can be vulnerable) - so correctly to write about vulnerability not in Drupal, but exactly in Captcha module. Second, in your PoC (bruteforce exploit for Drupal) you're talking about Brute Force hole. But in title you said about insecure Captcha (which is Insufficient Anti-automation). These are different classes of vulnerabilities, like in WASC TC - Brute Force (WASC-11) and Insufficient Anti-automation (WASC-21). So your title is not fully correct.
I don't care too much about WASC classification, as you probably do. wasc-21 can lead to wasc-11, so I don't want to bother on classifying these things.
This means the following: if I will be able to correctly solve the first Captcha challenge in the login form, but the login credentials are invalid, there will be no new Captcha challenge to solve in the login form presented after the HTTP response. In this situation is possible to automate a dictionary/bruteforcing attack.This a little different from my hole - in my hole I'm bypassing captcha without any correct solving of challenges, i.e. complete bypass (and "persistence option" will not help against my attack). But your advisory is still close to mine ;-). Third, concerning the dates. At 2010-12-10 I announced different vulnerabilities in Drupal (http://websecurity.com.ua/4749/), found in summer. Including Insufficient Anti-automation vulnerabilities concerning captcha (as I'll write in my advisory, there are IAA holes as in captcha, as in Drupal itself). At 2010-12-11 I informed Drupal about these vulnerabilities in Drupal. At 2010-12-11 John Morahan from Drupal security team answered me. And in particular he stated, that Drupal Captcha is separate module. At 2010-12-12 I draw John's attention, that IAA holes existed not only in captcha module, but in Drupal itself (so it concerned Drupal too). At 2010-12-15 I announced new vulnerabilities in Drupal (http://websecurity.com.ua/4749/), found in summer. Including Brute Force (as concerning captcha module, as Drupal itself). At 2010-12-16 I informed Drupal about these vulnerabilities in Drupal. So as you can see I announced and informed developers more than month before you. Did they told you, that I informed them about similar attacks and very close holes in December? Looks like they didn't. Which is strange, it's unlikely that they forgot after just a month about it or that the whole Drupal security team had amnesia in January. All these holes in Drupal (from my 4 advisories concerning Drupal) will be disclosed soon. It was planned for February, so at this week I begun disclosing these holes.
They didn't told me anything: I've been in contact with Jakub Suchy and Mori Sugimoto. They said that the issue I've reported qualified for public disclosure. Probably they didn't told me about you because they don't give a shit about you, as all of us that write in FD do :) Have a good day mr. MustLive
So, Michele, good luck in your security researches. Best wishes & regards, MustLive Administrator of Websecurity web site http://websecurity.com.ua [Full-disclosure] [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Michele Orru antisnatchor at gmail.com Thu Feb 10 12:15:01 GMT 2011Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Name: Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Systems Affected: Drupal <= 6.20 with Captcha <= 2.3 Severity: Medium Vendor: http://drupal.org Advisory: http://antisnatchor.com/Drupal_insecure_Captcha_defaults_PoC Author: Michele "antisnatchor" Orru` (michele.orru AT antisnatchor DOT com) Date: 20110210 I. BACKGROUND Drupal is a world-wide used open-source CMS written in PHP: being really flexible and easy to extend, is the de-facto choice for many small and big websites/portals that need a robust framework on which model their business. II. DESCRIPTION Many Drupal users use Captcha challenges (specially with reCaptcha) in their websites to protect sensitive resources from bots and spammers. In fact, we've always red and seen Captcha (Drupal or not) implemented to protect sensitive forms from online dictionary and bruteforcing attacks. The default configuration of Persistence options for the Captcha module in Drupal are insecure: the persistence option is set to "Omit challenges in a multi-step/preview workflow once the user successfully responds to a challenge." This means the following: if I will be able to correctly solve the first Captcha challenge in the login form, but the login credentials are invalid, there will be no new Captcha challenge to solve in the login form presented after the HTTP response. In this situation is possible to automate a dictionary/bruteforcing attack. III. ANALYSIS I've attached a two hours made Ruby PoC that automates a password guessing attack to a known username. The code is commented enough, but basically having the cookie, the form anti-xsrf token and the captcha token/sid the bruteforcing can be automated. These values should be changed in the code, in a way that the first request is valid and contains the right captcha sid and cookie: the next captcha/form tokens will be parsed and added to the HTTP requests automatically. An examle of the output: /opt/local/bin/ruby -e $stdout.sync=true;$stderr.sync=true;load($0=ARGV.shift) /Users/antisnatchor/WORKS/BEEF/drupal-intruder/drupal_captcha_intruder.rb +Initial xsrf token [form-43fb0bcbcb140066a782a3fc23ab1ab7] +Initial captcha token [d853d6df05f6c6a956a46f20c8fe20aa] +Dictionary attack with [4] passwords +Testing password [test1] +Request headers = {"Cookie"=>"SESS7fa63be60e31be67df6f271d7756698c=tgg548ajq53m4pb0ne18nsunm0; has_js=1;", "Referer"=>"http://antisnatchor.com/user", "Content-Type"=>"application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "User-Agent"=>"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13"} +Code = 200 +Message = OK +New xsrf token [form-f83fba9470bf8e3bfa035291b94fcc32] +New captcha token [aa6e143f8c43c6b1ec87b59f6ab5bf6d] +Testing password [test2] +Request headers = {"Cookie"=>"SESS7fa63be60e31be67df6f271d7756698c=tgg548ajq53m4pb0ne18nsunm0; has_js=1;", "Referer"=>"http://antisnatchor.com/user", "Content-Type"=>"application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "User-Agent"=>"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13"} +Code = 200 +Message = OK +New xsrf token [form-6fba4b48adf6cec02539075edb4fb5f6] +New captcha token [3e36c79be84a0cdf3a5eefbd0715ecdd] +Testing password [test3] +Request headers = {"Cookie"=>"SESS7fa63be60e31be67df6f271d7756698c=tgg548ajq53m4pb0ne18nsunm0; has_js=1;", "Referer"=>"http://antisnatchor.com/user", "Content-Type"=>"application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "User-Agent"=>"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13"} +Code = 200 +Message = OK +New xsrf token [form-a14e4668b0a8b7fa826bb04d1aa8590a] +New captcha token [c9a90bbd487de5733b7231ff832c5dd6] +Testing password [antisnatchor666!] +Request headers = {"Cookie"=>"SESS7fa63be60e31be67df6f271d7756698c=tgg548ajq53m4pb0ne18nsunm0; has_js=1;", "Referer"=>"http://antisnatchor.com/user", "Content-Type"=>"application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "User-Agent"=>"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13"} +Code = 302 +Message = Moved Temporarily +Succesfully authenticated user[admin] with password [guessme] A little note: to try it you need a few ruby gems like nokogiri you'll probably don't have normally. IV. DETECTION 6.20 and earlier versions are vulnerable. V. WORKAROUND Proper configuration of Drupal flood protection module should mitigate this issue. Also changing the Captcha persistence options to "Always add a challenge" will mitigate attacks. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE No fix available. VII. CVE INFORMATION No CVE at this time. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 20110116 Initial vendor contact 20110118 Initial Drupal security team response 20110124 Mitigation discussion 20110210 Public Disclosure IX. CREDIT Michele "antisnatchor" Orru' X. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright (c) 2011 Michele "antisnatchor" Orru' Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert electronically. It may not be edited in any way without mine express written consent. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please email me for permission. Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information.
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Current thread:
- Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC MustLive (Feb 14)
- Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Eyeballing Weev (Feb 14)
- Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Michele Orru (Feb 15)
- Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Eyeballing Weev (Feb 15)
- Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Michele Orru (Feb 15)
- Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Michele Orru (Feb 15)
- Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Jacqui Caren-home (Feb 18)
- Re: [AntiSnatchOr] Drupal <= 6.20 insecure Captcha defaults PoC Eyeballing Weev (Feb 14)