Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: SSL/TLS MiTM PoC
From: Anıl Kurmuş <akurmus () gmail com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 22:07:20 +0100
This flaw has been considered as unlikely to be exploited for HTTPS, as it only allows the attacker to inject prefixes. By changing the "trick" given by Marsh Ray, the attacker can increase his possibilities. More detail, and an example of the use of a slightly modified version of this PoC to steal twitter credentials over an SSL link: http://securegoose.org/2009/11/tls-renegotiation-vulnerability-cve.html Cheers, Anıl Kurmuş --------------- GPG key: http://perso.telecom-paristech.fr/~kurmus/key On Thu, Nov 5, 2009 at 22:54, Pavel Kankovsky <peak () argo troja mff cuni cz> wrote:
It might not work with up-to-date OpenSSL. Fixing that is left as an exercise for the reader. -- Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak / Jeremiah 9:21 \ "For death is come up into our MS Windows(tm)..." \ 21st century edition / _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
_______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Current thread:
- SSL/TLS MiTM PoC Pavel Kankovsky (Nov 05)
- Re: SSL/TLS MiTM PoC Anıl Kurmuş (Nov 11)