Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: Creating a rogue CA certificate


From: "fd throwaway" <fd.throwaway () gmail com>
Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2008 07:41:23 -0500

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From: full-disclosure-bounces () lists grok org uk

[*mailto:full-disclosure-bounces () lists grok org uk*<full-disclosure-bounces () lists grok org uk>]
On Behalf

Of jlay () slave-tothe-box net

Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2008 3:17 PM

To: full-disclosure () lists grok org uk

Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Creating a rogue CA certificate



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SSL/PKI is only as strong as the weakest CA...



For those of you who haven't been following this, here you go:



*http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/*<http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/>

*http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/md5-collisions-1.0.ppt*<http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/md5-collisions-1.0.ppt>



Enjoy and Happy New Years!



elazar

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--

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From Microsoft:

*http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx*<http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx>



"Microsoft is not aware of specific attacks against MD5, so

previously issued certificates that were signed using MD5 are

not affected and do not need to be revoked. This issue only

affects certificates being signed using MD5 after the

publication of the attack method."



I take it the above is incorrect?



James



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No it is correct because the attack creates a new CA from the compromised
cert which is then used to sign certs, it doesn't involve copying the
signatures of certs that already have been signed by legit CAs with the
exception of the one that is used to create the rogue CA
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Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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