Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: [WEB SECURITY] Attacking Password Recovery Facilities
From: "Esteban Ribičić" <kisero () gmail com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2007 10:45:39 +0200
when the provider sends and email with a link + hash, it normally wont allow you to send you another link (lets say password recovery email) unless the timeout for the first one expires...the timeout is normally a time/cost function that limits how long or how much money it would cost you to get the hash predicted the following attempt (usually hours) anyway, nice website mailinator.com, can be handy!!! anyone knows for how long it keeps your emails? probably not much! is anyone aware of cool sampling tools that tries usual tricks (like b8/64/etc encoding, etc) and non-usual ones? On 7/6/07, pdp (architect) <pdp.gnucitizen () googlemail com> wrote:
http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/attacking-password-recovery-facilities this is a small article from ap (aka pagvac) on how to attack password recovery facilities. this post just briefly scratches the surface and I am sure that he will come up with more stuff in the near future. Nevertheless, he brought some interesting points. Hava a look. Cheers. -- pdp (architect) | petko d. petkov http://www.gnucitizen.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Join us on IRC: irc.freenode.net #webappsec Have a question? Search The Web Security Mailing List Archives: http://www.webappsec.org/lists/websecurity/ Subscribe via RSS: http://www.webappsec.org/rss/websecurity.rss [RSS Feed]
_______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Current thread:
- Attacking Password Recovery Facilities pdp (architect) (Jul 06)
- Re: [WEB SECURITY] Attacking Password Recovery Facilities Esteban Ribičić (Jul 11)