Full Disclosure mailing list archives
RE: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design
From: "Gaidosch, Tamas" <Tamas.Gaidosch () kpmg hu>
Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 09:12:46 +0200
Based on your description I see this as a security design problem as well, but only exploitable if the user does a one-time password based logon while the token is plugged in. It would be inteteresting to know whether folks at RSA did a risk assessment when decided to implement this functionality. Good example how ease of use and complexity have adverse effects on security. Plain old SecurID tokens that cannot be connected to anything are better. Regards, Tamas -----Original Message----- From: Hadmut Danisch [mailto:hadmut () danisch de] Sent: Thursday, September 07, 2006 8:50 PM To: full-disclosure () lists grok org uk; bugtraq () securityfocus com Subject: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design Hi, I recently tested an RSA SecurID SID800 Token http://www.rsasecurity.com/products/securid/datasheets/SID800_DS_0205.pd f The token is bundled with some windows software designed to make user's life easier. Interestingly, this software provides a function which directly copies the current token code into the cut-and-paste buffer, when the token is plugged in into USB. This is weak by design. The security of these tokens is based on what RSA calls "two-factor user authentication": It takes both a secret (PIN) and the time-dependend Token-Code to authenticate. The security of the Token-Code depends on the assumption that the token is resistant against malware or intruders on the computer used for communication (web browser, VPN client,...). However, if the Token Code can be read over the USB bus, this assumption does not hold. A single attack on the PC where the token is plugged in would compromise both the PIN (e.g. with a keylogger) and the token itself (e.g. writing a daemon which continuously polls the token and forwards the token in real time to a remote attacker. Ironically this could make an attack even easier: If some malware simultaneously monitors the token and the keyboard, it is much easier to detect that the keystrokes are actually related to some login procedure: Whenever the 6-digit token code appears in the keyboard or cut-and-paste input stream, you can be pretty sure that in a sliding window of about the last 100-200 keystrokes both the PIN and the address of the server to login is contained. Makes it really easy to automatically detect secrets in the input stream. Thus, two different authentication methods are together weaker than each single one. regards Hadmut ********************************************************************** The information in this e-mail is confidential and may be legally privileged. It is intended solely for the addressee. Access to this e-mail by anyone else is unauthorized. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, copy, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on it, is prohibited and may be unlawful. When addressed to our clients any options or advice contained in this e-mail are subject to the terms and conditions expressed in the governing KPMG Client engagement letter or contract. This footnote also confirms that this e-mail message has been swept by MIMESweeper for the presence of computer viruses. ********************************************************************** ********************************************************************** The information in this e-mail is confidential and may be legally privileged. It is intended solely for the addressee. Access to this e-mail by anyone else is unauthorized. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, copy, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on it, is prohibited and may be unlawful. When addressed to our clients any options or advice contained in this e-mail are subject to the terms and conditions expressed in the governing KPMG Client engagement letter or contract. This footnote also confirms that this e-mail message has been swept by Postini for the presence of computer viruses. ********************************************************************** _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Current thread:
- Re[3]: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design, (continued)
- Re[3]: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design 3APA3A (Sep 11)
- Re: Re[3]: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design Brian Eaton (Sep 11)
- Re[5]: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design 3APA3A (Sep 11)
- Re: Re: Re[3]: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design 3APA3A (Sep 11)
- Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design Bojan Zdrnja (Sep 09)
- RE: Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design Lyal Collins (Sep 09)
- Re: Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design Brian Eaton (Sep 09)
- Re: Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design Bojan Zdrnja (Sep 11)
- Re[2]: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design 3APA3A (Sep 11)