Re: Root password change

[Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu]

On Fri, 31 Mar 2006 12:33:28 EST, gboyce said:
> In which case the person needs to remove the hard drive, and put it into a 
> different system for the modifications (or mirroring).

Time constraints.  The amount of time needed to pop in a disk and hit reboot
is (or should be, in this case) a lot shorter than the amount of time it takes
to pull a rack-mount box out and pop the lid and play with the drives.

And if your server has a lockable faceplate like most Dell rack-mounts, that
can add a lot to the challenge right there (as it stops any quick "snarf a
hot-swap drive and run" scheme).

> For the most part, if an attacker has physical access to the hardware 
> itself, you just lose.

Almost, but not quite right.  If the attacker has physical access *for long enough*,
you lose.

Even the specs for a GSA Class 5 security container (usually referred to as
a "crypto safe"), which is the highest level, only specify  entry protection
of 10 man-minutes forced entry, 20 man-hours surreptitious entry, and
30 man-minutes covert entry, with specified man-portable tools.  "Forced
entry" means "We don't care *how* much noise the drills and explosives and
torches make", while "covert" means "without making noise", and "surreptitious"
means "without leaving noticable marks when you're done".  And of course,
the testing is done by an expert locksmith with special expertise in this
sort of attack....

The reason this is so is because if the safe will hold for 30 minutes, then
you just need a Marine with live ammo and instructions to shoot first walk by
every 15 minutes, or get there in 5 minutes after the alarms go off....

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