Full Disclosure mailing list archives
RE: How hackers cause damage... was Vulnerabilites in new laws on computer hacking
From: "Craig Wright" <cwright () bdosyd com au>
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 08:28:14 +1100
Hi Jason First I do agree that vulnerable software is an issue, I also would love to see a world where I was not needed for the skills I peddle. I would like a world where compliance was not necessary, where fraud did not occur... The "state of doubt" I was referring to is the condition of determination associated with knowledge that a system has been attacked. The determination that the attacker was benign or malevolent leaves one in doubt as to the true intentions and thus one has to err towards the side of the assumption that the attack was malign. Please do not let me asperse your passion for fixing the flaws inherent in the world. I wish you all the best on this, but I have become a little more jaded over time. I also teach CAATs based methods to determine corporate financial fraud and accounts fraud as well as the more information security focused risk that this list propagates. People are generally in a state of denial this is true, but why should that be the issue. I preach awareness all the time, yet I would prefer a world where this is not needed. Who do we blame - the victim who did not take adequate care or the criminal? If I walk down a dark alley at night is it my fault if I get mugged? Should it be? It may be ignorant but who are we protecting and what type of society do we want to create? Regards, Craig -----Original Message----- From: Jason Coombs [mailto:jasonc () science org] Sent: 24 February 2006 8:08 To: Craig Wright Cc: security-basics () securityfocus com; fla.linux () gmail com; Full-Disclosure; bugtraq () securityfocus com Subject: Re: How hackers cause damage... was Vulnerabilites in new laws on computer hacking Craig Wright wrote:
Cyber-trespass leaves one in a state of doubt. It is commonly stated that the only manner of recovery from a system compromise is to >
rebuild the host. Don't you mean that the trespass disrupts the condition of denial and neglect that normally exists surrounding any network of programmable computers? The 'state of doubt' is no different post-trespass than it was beforehand, what has changed is the emotional condition of the property owner. After recovery steps to rebuild the host, there is again a 'state of doubt' and it is just as substantial as it was before the trespass incident caused everyone emotional trauma. We must build computer systems that separate the act of installing and executing software from the act of depositing data on read/write media. Executable code must not be stored on read/write media. At least not the same media to which data is written, and access to write data to software storage must not be possible through the execution of software; at least not software executing on the same CPU as already-installed software. Our CPUs need a mechanism to verify that the machine code instructions being executed have been previously authorized for execution by the CPU, i.e. the machine code is part of software that has been purposefully installed to a protected software storage separate (logically, at least, and both physically and logically separated at best) through actions that could not have been simulated or duplicated by the execution of machine code at runtime on the system's primary CPU. The worst-case scenario of 'repair' and 'recovery' from any intrusion event should be verification of the integrity of protected storage, restore from backup of data storage, analysis of data processing and network traffic logs to ascertain the mode of intrusion (if possible) and reboot of the affected box with a staged reintroduction of the services that box previously provided (if you just re-launch all of the services being exposed by the box then it is just as vulnerable as before to whatever attack resulted in the intrusion, so you start from the most-locked-down condition and add services one at a time, monitoring for a period of time at each step). Depending on the length of time one is willing to monitor the box as it is staged into deployment again after recovery, and depending on the tools put into place to enable verification of the authenticity and 'correctness' of the machine code found to be present on the protected storage where software is installed, 'recovery' from any incident can be almost immediate, requiring little more than a reboot (the steps for which could also be optimized in a well-built secure computer system, since the objective really is nothing more than wiping all RAM and re-reading machine code from the protected storage after integrity verification is complete) ... All of the 'damage' and 'vulnerabilities' you're talking about stem directly from very bad business decisions made by owners of computer systems and from authors of software made to run on those computer systems. Hackers can be made irrelevant, and virtually all significant damage from 'intrusion' can be prevented in advance, by putting a stop to the world's addiction to the installation and execution of arbitrary code. The problem is that the computer industry has been built around providing financial rewards to the businesses that can get as many copies of their code executing as possible, and security barriers that curtail access to this cash generating machine would kill 75% of the existing computer industry. I say let 'em die. Give us secure computing, and may every company that intentionally harms people for profit die a horrible and painful death that takes as many of its investors with it as possible in the process! Sincerely, Jason Coombs jasonc () science org Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation in respect of matters arising within those States and Territories of Australia where such legislation exists. DISCLAIMER The information contained in this email and any attachments is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use or disclose the information. If you have received this email in error, please inform us promptly by reply email or by telephoning +61 2 9286 5555. Please delete the email and destroy any printed copy. Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender. You may not rely on this message as advice unless it has been electronically signed by a Partner of BDO or it is subsequently confirmed by letter or fax signed by a Partner of BDO. BDO accepts no liability for any damage caused by this email or its attachments due to viruses, interference, interception, corruption or unauthorised access. _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Current thread:
- RE: How hackers cause damage... was Vulnerabilites in new laws on computer hacking Craig Wright (Feb 23)
- Re: How hackers cause damage... was Vulnerabilites in new laws on computer hacking Jason Coombs (Feb 23)