Re: MSIE (mshtml.dll) OBJECT tag vulnerability

[<ipatches () hushmail com>]

> Perhaps not surprisingly, there appears to be a vulnerability in 
how
> Microsoft Internet Explorer handles (or fails to handle) certain
> combinations of nested OBJECT tags. This was tested with MSIE
> 6.0.2900.2180.xpsp.040806-1825 and mshtml.dll 6.00.2900.2873
> xpsp_sp2_gdr.060322-1613.
>
> At first sight, this vulnerability may offer a remote compromise 
vector,
> although not necessarily a reliable one. The error is convoluted 
and
> difficult to debug in absence of sources; as such, I cannot offer 
a
> definitive attack scenario, nor rule out that my initial 
diagnosis will be
> proved wrong [*]. As such, panic, but only slightly.
>
> Probably the easiest way to trigger the problem is as follows:
>
>   perl -e '{print "<STYLE></STYLE>\n<OBJECT>\nBork\n"x32}' 
> test.html
>
> ...this will (usually) cause a NULL pointer + fixed offset 
(eax+0x28)
> dereference in mshtml.dll, the pointer being read from allocated 
but still
> zeroed memory region.
>
> The aforementioned condition is not exploitable, but padding the 
page with
> preceeding OBJECT tag (and other tags), increasing the number of 
nested
> OBJECTs, and most importantly, adding bogus 'type=' parameters of 
various
> length to the final sequence of OBJECTs, will cause that 
dereference to
> become non-NULL on many installations; then, a range of other 
interesting
> faults should ensue, including dereferences of variable bogus 
addresses
> close to stack, or crashes later on, when the page is reloaded or 
closed.
> [ In absence of sources, I do not understand the precise 
underlying
>   mechanics of the bug, and I am not inclined to spend hours with 
a
>   debugger to find out. I'm simply judging by the symptoms, but 
these
>   seem to be indicative of an exploitable flaw. ]
>
> Several examples of pages that cause distinct faults in my setup 
(your
> mileage may and probably WILL vary; on three test machines, this 
worked as
> described; on one, all examples behaved in non-exploitable 0x28 
way):
>   http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/iedie2-1.html (eax=0x0, instant 
dereference)
>   http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/iedie2-2.html (bogus esi on 
reload/leave)
>   http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/iedie2-3.html (page fault on browser 
close)
>   http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/iedie2-4.html (bogus esi on 
reload/leave)
> Well, that's it. Feel free to research this further. This 
vulnerability,
> as requested by customers, is released in strict observance of 
the Patch
> Wednesday & Bug Saturday policy.
>
> [*] The ability of the attacker to document the attack scenario 
probably
>     doesn't matter for those who pretend to care; cryptic "hi" to
>     Secunia and their standards of conduct.
Sir, You work very well! I think you must also pester Microsoft. I 
also remember LSD pesters Microsoft and they were rapidly sold out.



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