Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet...
From: Tim <tim-security () sentinelchicken org>
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 11:10:44 -0500
Hello,
A couple of things to note from mr schneider's blog warning...
It's "schneier", not "schneider".
Fact..until it's published and the method handed out and it's replicated independently, SHA-1 is NOT broken.
I feel that statement is misleading. SHA-1 may be broken. It may have been broken years ago, for all we know, by some well-funded government. Just because the methods aren't available, that doesn't mean it isn't broken. Does this mean we can all trust these researchers to be telling the truth? No. No matter how trustworthy we think these guys are, the public can't be 100% sure that SHA-1 collisions can be found, until the methods are public and tested. That I agree with, and I think that's probably what you meant.
Fact..the people posting here missed a fairly important bit of schneider's blog-post, and I quote:The paper isn't generally available yet. At this point I can't tell ifthe attack is real. read it again: >>AT THIS POINT I CAN'T TELL IF THE ATTACK IS REAL.
Yes, exactly. In a way, it is all FUD until the methods are published. Hard to ignore FUD, though.
Fact: If the paper and method are sound...the sky STILL is not falling (although it will be raining pretty darned hard)...2^69 operations...to get a collision...how many hours of current gen cpu cycles?? (some notes from the blog thread postulate a 4 ghz machine would need 4000 years...4000 CPU@ 4 ghz ea ...1 year.) Based on the rumors, would I entrust state secrets to SHA-1? Nope. Digital signature on a dosument authorizing the use of Nukes against Utah? Nope. Failing that level of protection requirement, for the time being, of course I would, and will.
True, if the amount of computation required is 2**69, then it is still an attack out of reach for most applications, since it is often cheaper just to bribe people, or to hold them at gunpoint. However, if a specific collision in SHA-1 is released, as it was with MD5, then there are some special case attacks that can be done, without needing all that computational power. See: http://www.doxpara.com/md5_someday.pdf In addition, if these methods are eventually made public, peer review may yield extensions which are more efficient. It is at least something to keep an eye on. tim _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
Current thread:
- In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Tim (Feb 15)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Georgi Guninski (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Polarizer (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Polarizer (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Willem Koenings (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Bart . Lansing (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Tim (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Bart . Lansing (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Valdis . Kletnieks (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Bart . Lansing (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Lionel Ferette (Feb 17)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Vincent van Scherpenseel (Feb 17)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Martin Eian (Feb 17)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Willem Koenings (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Willem Koenings (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Bart . Lansing (Feb 16)
- Re: In case y'all didn't catch it yet... Willem Koenings (Feb 20)