Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: Juniper Netscreen VPN Username Enumeration Vulnerability
From: Roy Hills <Roy.Hills () nta-monitor com>
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 17:45:11 +0100
At 17:06 18/08/2005, ADT wrote:
Uh, wouldn't it just be a lot easier to sniff the traffic between the client and VPN gateway and get the IKE user id that way?
The difference is that this attack does not require the attacker to be in the path of the VPN traffic.
Of course, the NetScreen's could reply with some kind of response, but may lead to resource exhastion.
True, but there are ways to minimise this problem (rate limiting, using random data for the KE payload if the ID is invalid, etc.). Cisco, for one, have fixed the same problem in their VPN concentrator product.
As for "offline hash breaking attempts", re-read RFC2409 and see how easy it really is. Hint: the use of nonces really make things difficult. Doesn't excuse people from using their cat as their password, but effectively prevents rainbow table attacks. Would be attackers against NetScreen or any vendor for that matter are prolly better off finding a disgruntled employee and buying their username/password/securID token for $100 (or a bar of chocolate [2]).
ike-scan includes a program called psk-crack which does just that. Using OpenSSL's hash algorithms on a 2.8GHz P4 (not a super-fast system) you get about 350,000 attempts per second for MD5-based hashes, and about 250,000 for SHA1. This is enough to crack a dictionary word in seconds, or to do a brute-force search of a 6-character lower-case password in about 15 mins or an 8-character lower-case password in about seven days (assuming MD5 hash).
Sorry, but I don't think there's anything new or interesting here, other then to remind people that Aggressive Mode isn't as good as Main Mode, but everyone should of already of known that.
The problem is that, in practice, users are not aware of this. Witness the fact
that I've managed to discover valid username/password combinations for several systems based on the username enumeration issue plus PSK cracking, and that's with large organisations who "should have known better". What percentage of Netscreen VPNs are set up to use Aggressive Mode withPSK auth do you think? My findings (albeit from a limited sample size) indicate
that it's the vast majority. In the real world, it is a big risk. Roy -- Roy Hills Tel: +44 1634 721855 NTA Monitor Ltd FAX: +44 1634 721844 14 Ashford House, Beaufort Court, Medway City Estate, Email: Roy.Hills () nta-monitor comRochester, Kent ME2 4FA, UK WWW: http://www.nta-monitor.com/
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Current thread:
- Juniper Netscreen VPN Username Enumeration Vulnerability Roy Hills (Aug 18)
- Re: Juniper Netscreen VPN Username Enumeration Vulnerability ADT (Aug 18)
- Re: Juniper Netscreen VPN Username Enumeration Vulnerability Roy Hills (Aug 19)
- Re: Juniper Netscreen VPN Username Enumeration Vulnerability ADT (Aug 18)