Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: 802.11b (others) single packet DoS


From: "Andrew A. Vladimirov" <mlists () arhont com>
Date: Thu, 13 May 2004 19:26:23 +0100

The description of the attack appears to be too general and it is too early to say anything before a detailed practical implementation of the attack is shown (after all, this is Full Disclosure). From what I have gathered reading the provided link, it is a form of a casual jamming using a common wireless client card rather than a specific jamming device a la http://www.svbxlabs.com/pages/projects/herf005/

Well, if it is the case, then there is nothing new about it. Anyone who has experimented with FakeAP, knows that it can flood the channel pretty badly, especially if the attacker sets a smaller interval between beacons (e.g. with prism2_param beacon_int) and supplements it with the probe requests flood (looping prism2_param hostscan). As an example, see
http://www.wi-foo.com/phorum/read.php?f=1&i=24&t=11#reply_24
at our forum.

Regards,
Andrew

--
Dr. Andrew A. Vladimirov
CISSP #34081, CWNA, CCNP/CCDP, TIA Linux+
CSO
Arhont Ltd - Information Security.

Web: http://www.arhont.com
     http://www.wi-foo.com
Tel: +44 (0)870 44 31337
Fax: +44 (0)117 969 0141
GPG: Key ID - 0x1D312310
GPG: Server - gpg.arhont.com




michaeltone1975 wrote:
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=4091

The vulnerability is related to the medium access control (MAC)
function of the IEEE 802.11 protocol.  WLAN devices perform Carrier
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), which
minimises the likelihood of two devices transmitting
simultaneously.  Fundamental to the functioning of CSMA/CA is the
Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) procedure, used in all
standards-compliant hardware and performed by a Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) physical (PHY) layer.

An attack against this vulnerability exploits the CCA function at
the physical layer and causes all WLAN nodes within range, both
clients and access points (AP), to defer transmission of data for
the duration of the attack. When under attack, the device behaves
as if the channel is always busy, preventing the transmission of
any data over the wireless network.


http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf





_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html



_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html


Current thread: