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RE: COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition]

From: "Drew Copley" <dcopley () eEye com>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2004 11:31:37 -0700
 


-----Original Message-----
From: Jelmer [mailto:jkuperus () planet nl] 
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2004 3:22 PM
To: 'Thor Larholm'; Drew Copley; 
full-disclosure () lists netsys com; bugtraq () securityfocus com
Cc: ntbugtraq () listserv ntbugtraq com
Subject: RE: COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition]

Almost correct, though not quite, I fired up a packetsniffer 
while clicking
the link and witnessed a dns lookup taking place

--snip--

Standard query www.jelmer.com?redir=www.e-gold.com

--snip--

This actually resolves to e-gold As you can see

  C:\ >ping www.jelmer.com?redir=www.e-gold.com

  Pinging www.jelmer.com?redir=www.e-gold.com [63.240.230.10] 
with 32 bytes 
  of data: 

This is because they have setup wildcard dns for e-gold.com
So the combination ignore host header *AND* wildcard dns leads to an
exploitable condition

Tmf.nl for instance uses wildcard dns but complains about a 
malformed Host
header


Again, everybody ignores the host header. I routinely use "whatever"
as my host header. A poster to bugtraq was correct, though, some
characters
will cause bad request returns with some web servers. Encoding these
characters will allow them through in some situations (Google.com),
and some servers will continue to have problems (apache.org does not
like the backslash unencoded normally -- the other script characters
and such are fine with it).


In some scenarios, encoding the characters should work.

As IE is forming the malformed host header in the connect, and
this is causing some problems with exploitability, it may/probably
is possible to put in some control line feeds to start a new line
for the request header. It might further be noted the full control
line feed sequence is not needed for a new line for some servers...
and there are other characters which are possibly interpreted as
this. (IIS and Apache, have, historically, allowed such situations,
which have helped in IDS evasion scenarios).





<a href="http://www.microsoft.com%2F redir=www.tmf.nl">test</a>


-----Original Message-----
From: Thor Larholm [mailto:thor () pivx com] 
Sent: vrijdag 11 juni 2004 3:10
To: Drew Copley; full-disclosure () lists netsys com; 
bugtraq () securityfocus com
Cc: ntbugtraq () listserv ntbugtraq com
Subject: RE: COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition]

You can't replicate this with most other servers because the 
Host header
is set to a non-existant site on most servers.

Whenever IIS or Apache receives a request it will first locate the
proper site based on the IP adress being used, after which it will
lookup based on the Host header. In the case of e-gold, they 
have simply
not specified a Host header for the IIS website that they configured.
You can send a HTTP request to e-gold.com with "Host: foobar" 
and their
site still comes up, even though you should only get their site with a
header such as "Host: e-gold.com" or "Host: www.e-gold.com".

HTTP 1.1 requires the use of a Host header and it is bad practice to
accept HTTP requests without a Host header that corresponds 
to a locally
configured site. In most cases with IIS, this only happens if you are
using the Default Website or explicitly has choosen to not specify a
Host header for the site. You can specify multiple Host headers for a
site so there is not much excuse not to do so.

Whenever IE wants to send an HTTP request it first needs to determine
what server to connect to. Because of the URL escaping IE disregards
anything before the slash and equal sign, and sees that it has to send
an HTTP request to www.e-gold.com. It is only after IE has determined
what server to request information from that it URL decodes 
the URI and
ends up with http://www.microsoft.com/redir=www.e-gold.com, which it
then displays in the Address Bar and subsequently uses to 
determine what
security zone it should use to render the HTML. IE only decides what
security zone to use based on the Address Bar value after it has
successfully downloaded all of the HTML (untill then it is in the
Unknown Zone), at which point the URL decoding has long since 
happened.

If you want to exploit this to serve content from your site in the
security zone of another site, you will need to disregard the Host
header being sent by the client. A perfect candidate you can 
use to gain
additional privileges is WindowsUpdate.microsoft.com or
oca.microsoft.com who are both in the Trusted Sites security zone on a
default installation of Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP SP2. 

You should be able to use this to compromise Windows XP SP2 through
Internet Explorer despite the My Computer zone hardening since the
Trusted Sites Zone has all of the privileges you need to plant and
execute a file.



Regards

Thor Larholm
Senior Security Researcher
PivX Solutions
24 Corporate Plaza #180
Newport Beach, CA 92660
http://www.pivx.com
thor () pivx com
Stock symbol: (PIVX)
Phone: +1 (949) 231-8496
PGP: 0x5A276569
6BB1 B77F CB62 0D3D 5A82 C65D E1A4 157C 5A27 6569

PivX defines a new genre in Desktop Security: Proactive Threat
Mitigation. 
<http://www.pivx.com/qwikfix>


-----Original Message-----
From: Drew Copley [mailto:dcopley () eEye com] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2004 4:40 PM
To: full-disclosure () lists netsys com; bugtraq () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: [Fwd: [Full-disclosure] COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing
Expedition]






Subject: [Full-disclosure] COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition
From:    "http-equiv () excite com" <1 () malware com>
Date:    Thu, June 10, 2004 12:35 pm
To:      full-disclosure () lists netsys com
--------------------------------------------------------------
------------



Thursday, June 10, 2004

The following was presented by 'bitlance winter' of Japan today:

<a href="http://www.microsoft.com%2F redir=www.e- gold.com">test</a>

Quite inexplicable from these quarters. Perhaps someone with server 
'knowledge' can examine it.

It carries over the address into the address bar:

[screen shot: http://www.malware.com/gosh.png 72KB]

while redirecting to egold. The key being %2F without that 

it fails. 

The big question is where is the 'redir' and why is it only 

applicable


[so far] to e-gold. Other sites don't work and e- gold is 

running an 

old Microsoft-IIS/4.0.



IE makes this into a connection with e-gold.com like so:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg,
application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint,
application/msword, application/x-shockwave-flash, */*
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 
5.2; .NET CLR
1.1.4322; .NET CLR 1.0.3705)
Host: www.microsoft.com/ redir=www.e-gold.com
Connection: Keep-Alive

It never touches microsoft.com.

What is interesting, though, is IE spoofs the zone. If you change
www.microsoft.com in there to a site in your trusted zone, 
you will see
e-gold read as your trusted zone.

So, you should be able to bounce from any trusted zone and 
theoritically
from local zone -- and with adodb still being open, you should be able
to run code because of the open adodb issue.

IE doesn't talk to e-gold first. It connects to it. It sends the GET
request, it receives the first page. 

But, can't replicate with other servers. It requires some 
more research.




Working Example:

http://www.malware.com/golly.html


credit: 'bitlance winter'


End Call

--
http://www.malware.com






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