Full Disclosure mailing list archives

RE: bzip2 bombs still causes problems in antivirus-software


From: Steve Wray <steve.wray () paradise net nz>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2004 14:42:29 +1300

It would probably be a good idea to implement ulimit
restrictions on the user that the software runs as.

I had awful problems with the syntax on that sentence,
but I am sure you will know what it means.
:)

Also you should be aware that the software doesn't automatically
clear the leftovers out of the filesystem.

One suggestion I've heard is to put the directory where the
zip files get unpacked for software forensics & antivirus detection
be on tmpfs or some such. That way, after a reboot its guaranteed
to not be there. Or something like that. (my favorite sentence)

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com 
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com] On Behalf Of 
Dr. Peter Bieringer
Sent: Saturday, 10 January 2004 6:38
To: full-disclosure () lists netsys com; bugtraq () securityfocus com
Subject: [Full-disclosure] bzip2 bombs still causes problems 
in antivirus-software


Hi,

sure you remember the e-mail from Steve Wray in August 2003 
about bzip2 
bombs and the possible DoS against antivirus-software:
http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-August/
009255.html

We found that this is still an issue, especially we found 
that one vendor 
detects bzip2 bombs by pattern (2 GB of zeros are detected, 
but not 2 GB of 
e.g. 0x31).

Also others will neither detect the bomb, nor stopping 
decompression, looks 
like they missing smart code for anomaly detection and/or 
proper limits and 
eat all existing disk space and CPU power instead of 
reporting a problem.


Namely we confirm this issue still exists on:

* kavscanner of
   Kaspersky AntiVirus for Linux 5.0.1.0 (probably all 
versions since 4.5)
* vscan of
   Trend Micro InterScan VirusWall 3.8 Build 1130
* uvscan of
   McAfee Virus Scan for Linux v4.16.0


Probably other versions and products are vulnerable, too.


Full advisory is available here:

http://www.aerasec.de/security/advisories/txt/bzip2bomb-antivirusengines
.txt


Hope this helps to bring this issue up again on software vendors to 
implement more smarter anomaly detection code and configurable limits 
(number of files, max size) in the decompression unit.


Regards,
        Dr. Peter Bieringer
-- 
Dr. Peter Bieringer                             Phone: +49-8102-895190
AERAsec Network Services and Security GmbH        Fax: +49-8102-895199
Wagenberger Straße 1                           Mobile: +49-174-9015046
D-85662 Hohenbrunn                       E-Mail: pbieringer () aerasec de
Germany                                Internet: http://www.aerasec.de

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