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[OpenPKG-SA-2003.039] OpenPKG Security Advisory (perl)


From: OpenPKG <openpkg () openpkg org>
Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2003 17:03:04 +0200

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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security () openpkg org                         openpkg () openpkg org
OpenPKG-SA-2003.039                                          15-Sep-2003
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             perl (CGI.pm)
Vulnerability:       cross site scripting
OpenPKG Specific:    yes

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:        Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= perl-5.8.0-20030903    >= perl-5.8.0-20030915
OpenPKG 1.3          <= perl-5.8.0-1.3.0       >= perl-5.8.0-1.3.1
OpenPKG 1.2          <= perl-5.8.0-1.2.0       >= perl-5.8.0-1.2.1

Dependent Packages:  none

Description:
  This message is a continuation of OpenPKG-SA-2003.036-perl-www [0].
  The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the
  id CAN-2003-0615 [1] to the problem described. This document also
  outlines an important problematic regarding the native load order of
  Perl modules.

  The CGI.pm module not only comes with the "perl-www" package but an
  ancient version 2.81 is also embedded into the "perl" package. The
  corrected packages mentioned above have the official fix backported to
  the embedded version.

  Be aware that all releases of OpenPKG up to and including 1.3 use
  Perl's native load order for modules where embedded modules are
  preferred over additional modules. This means that the CGI.pm
  embedded into the "perl" package is loaded before the sibling from
  the additional "perl-www" package is found. This inhibits the use and
  correction of additional modules with same name as embedded ones.

  It should be noted that beginning with perl-5.8.0-20030903 the load
  order is adjusted to prefer additional modules over embedded ones [2].
  There are no plans modifiying the module load order of the "perl"
  package in existing releases. Although more intuitive, it would change
  existing behaviour and is likely to break existing installations.
  During the support lifecycle, security advisories and corrected
  packages will be issued for both embedded and additional packages.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
  perl". If you have the "perl" package installed and its version is
  affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
  (see Solution). [3][4]

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
  location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
  from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  binary RPM [4]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.3, perform the
  following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
  other releases adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/1.3/UPD
  ftp> get perl-5.8.0-1.3.1.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig perl-5.8.0-1.3.1.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild perl-5.8.0-1.3.1.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/perl-5.8.0-1.3.1.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0] http://www.openpkg.org/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.036-perl-www.html
  [1] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0615
  [2] http://cvs.openpkg.org/chngview?cn=11997
  [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/perl-5.8.0-1.2.1.src.rpm
  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/perl-5.8.0-1.3.1.src.rpm
  [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
  [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/
  [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg () openpkg org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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