Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: Re: Pudent default security
From: Jay Sulzberger <jays () panix com>
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 00:07:06 -0400 (EDT)
On Sun, 28 Sep 2003, Paul Schmehl wrote:
--On Sunday, September 28, 2003 10:20 PM -0400 "security () brvenik com" <security () brvenik com> wrote:I would add yet another take on this.[sniipped a lot of good thinking]I think that the problem is not the protocol or the application. It is a fundamental lack of understanding of the security model and the network as a whole.Yes, that is what I was trying to say, however lamely. The preponderance of discussions and papers on security today focus on the network and how to control the flow of data/packets. But in the final analysis, the problems always come down to the individual machine, be it server or workstation. Why aren't security ideas focusing on that problem primarily? Oh, we all know you shouldn't run unnecessary services, but that's about as far as the wisdom goes. SANS has made some efforts in this area with their best practices documents, but where is the software development to address it? The Bastille is about the only thing I can think of off the top of my head that even attempts to address this area. The OS vendors are beginning to come around to the off-by-default model (slowly), but protecting what *must* be on (such as CIFS, SMB, NFS) is still a laborious (or outrageously expensive) process when you're trying to do it on an enterprise level. IMO the vendors should be providing these types of tools as an integral part of the OS in addition to shipping in an off-by-default model. It should be trivial to "do security" in an OS. (It still blows my mind that every WinXP box comes with UPnP on by default. RPC I can *almost* understand, but UPnP???) I'm saying we need a paradigm shift in *thinking* about how an OS should be configured out of the box *and* a paradigm shift in the ease of configuration on an enterprise level. Paul Schmehl (pauls () utdallas edu)
Many computer programs are today: 1. unconscious 2. promiscuous 3. incontinent 4. unsupervised Most programs should be: 1. somewhat self-aware 2. almost chaste and quite delicate in their affections 3. tight-sphinctered 4. well supervised by programs with the power to detect and suppress bad behavior oo--JS. _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
Current thread:
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly, (continued)
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Karl DeBisschop (Sep 28)
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Paul Schmehl (Sep 28)
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Michal Zalewski (Sep 28)
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Florian Weimer (Sep 28)
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Frank Knobbe (Sep 28)
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Michal Zalewski (Sep 28)
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Frank Knobbe (Sep 28)
- Re: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Paul Schmehl (Sep 28)
- Pudent default security - Was: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly security () brvenik com (Sep 28)
- Re: Pudent default security Paul Schmehl (Sep 28)
- Re: Re: Pudent default security Jay Sulzberger (Sep 28)
- Re: Re: Pudent default security Ed Carp (Sep 29)
- Re: Re: Pudent default security Jay Sulzberger (Sep 28)
- Re: Re: Pudent default security Ed Carp (Sep 29)
- Re: Re: Pudent default security Jay Sulzberger (Sep 28)
- Re: Re: Pudent default security Shannon Johnston (Sep 29)
- Re: Pudent default security - Was: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Michal Zalewski (Sep 29)
- RE: Re: Pudent default security - Was: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Steve Wray (Sep 30)
- RE: Re: Pudent default security - Was: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Michal Zalewski (Sep 30)
- RE: Re: Pudent default security - Was: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly Steve Wray (Sep 30)
- RE: Re: Pudent default security - Was: CyberInsecurity: The cost of Monopoly j (Sep 30)