RE: Avoiding being a good admin - was DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)

["Bojan Zdrnja" <Bojan.Zdrnja () LSS hr>]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com 
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com] On Behalf Of 
> Ron DuFresne
> Sent: Wednesday, 30 July 2003 8:51 a.m.
> To: Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu
> Cc: Jason; full-disclosure () lists netsys com
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Avoiding being a good admin - 
> was DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c) 

> Still the best defensive porture is taken at the entrance and exit points
> as pertains to most all these 'services'.  If the ports 135 and 1433 etc
> are blocked, both tcp and udp protocols, then patching becomes far less
> dramatic, even if a few machines inside get infected due to laptops or
> what have you.  when the flow on the wire for a segment

Perimeter blocking is not everything.
It's an important part of your security policy, but I think you're
overstating that.

Is it too difficult to write a worm which will spread through RPC DCOM (this
is just to stay OT) *AND* mass e-mailing. See that? Mass e-mails ... You can
have the best port blocking in the world and still be infected in a second.

The solution for this is long term improvement of security, strong security
policies *AND* education.

Regards,

Bojan Zdrnja

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html