Full Disclosure mailing list archives
RE: Disabling Cached Logon Credentials
From: "Nick Duda" <nduda () VistaPrint com>
Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2003 09:40:23 -0500
Is it safe to say that a secured data center is in fact secured? Not naming certain datacenters I've used but in one of them they hold onto the keycard to the facility. They require the person requesting it to sign in and give the valid cage number and some minor security answers to get the key card. Social Engineering can have a field day with this.
Let's expand the definition of half-baked security. Half-baked
security is implementing settings that are not necessary, which increase the TCO of the platform (via increasing downtime of revenue generating applications while trying to return them to service).
I believe disabling cached logon credentials for servers in data
centers falls into the above definition This is where I disagree. Logon credientials being cached do not fall under the TCO situation. Having admin password 50 characters long and stored in a vault needing 2 keys to unlock it does. In fact I would assume that disabling cached logon credentials would be the ideal situation for a server(s) in a data center no matter how secure one finds it. If you do not have constant physical access to the server and someone else can when you cant (never say never), then by all means the above situation requires even little security measures such as Cached logon credentials being disabled. My .02 - Nick -----Original Message----- From: dwr3ck () hushmail com [mailto:dwr3ck () hushmail com] Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2003 9:23 AM To: full-disclosure () lists netsys com; Nick Duda Subject: RE: Disabling Cached Logon Credentials Even with physical access you (a hacker) want to do what you have to ,leave and still be undetected. If a hacker is going to get to a physical server only to change the admin password and do some hack (i.e. trojan), I would find it silly because when the admin finds out that its not a password he supplied, that system is as good as formatted.
True but some companies have thousands of servers with dozens of
Admins. Maybe even humdreds of servers in remote offices. Might not always catch changed passwords right away. Event log software, custom scripts etc. can help to watch for admin acccount changes but sometimes budgets get in the way of implementing solutions. This is why disbaling stuff like autoplay on cd roms is a good idea, and not to just lock servers screensavers but rather logout.
Agreed. I'm only talking about cached logon credentials on this
thread. I don't think disbaling cached logons is something to worry about if in a secured data center, but merly a common practice for any security professional (i.e. do the job right, or don't do it at all, don't halfass when it comes to security) - Nick
Let's expand the definition of half-baked security. Half-baked
security is implementing settings that are not necessary, which increase the TCO of the platform (via increasing downtime of revenue generating applications while trying to return them to service).
I believe disabling cached logon credentials for servers in data
centers falls into the above definition.
-----Original Message----- From: dwr3ck () hushmail com [mailto:dwr3ck () hushmail com] Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 1:29 PM To: focus-ms () securityfocus com; full-disclosure () lists netsys com Subject: Disabling Cached Logon Credentials Disabling cached logon credentials is on virtually every server hardening checklist. If you have your servers physically secured in a data center what is the real benefit of disabling cached logon credentials? Whenever a server is off the network, admins have to obtain the local admin password. Depending on how you handle local RID=500 account passwords this can add significantly to downtime when resolving issues. Does anyone know of a way to exploit cached credentials over the wire? If someone has physical access to a system they own it anyway: http://home.eunet.no/~pnordahl/ntpasswd/
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Current thread:
- Disabling Cached Logon Credentials dwr3ck (Dec 30)
- Re: Disabling Cached Logon Credentials Nicolas RUFF (lists) (Dec 31)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Disabling Cached Logon Credentials Nick Duda (Dec 30)
- RE: Disabling Cached Logon Credentials dwr3ck (Dec 31)
- RE: Disabling Cached Logon Credentials Nick Duda (Dec 31)