Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?)
From: "Christopher Lee" <clee () myhome homeip net>
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2004 22:44:35 -0500
Just an FYI. Radware's DefensePro (or its IPS add-on on their platform, in general) does not do packet re-assembly (i.e. reconstruction of the data streams/sessions), it merely does string-matchings on the packets alone. I don't know Netscreen IDP, but I am curious to know if (and how) it actually reassembles packets before its inspection... Chris -----Original Message----- From: firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com] On Behalf Of Stiennon,Richard Sent: February 26, 2004 12:51 PM To: Ben Nagy; firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com Subject: RE: IPS (was: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?) Here are the definitions I am working with: Network IPS: An inline device that assembles packets into streams or sessions and parses them. Multiple methodologies to determine malicious intent. Usually includes signature, protocol anomaly, behavior and flow capabilities. The ability to drop sessions associated with attacks. Note, this is dramatically different than a firewall that can close *connections* based on source-destination-port. Definitions are often helped out by a set of reference vendors. In my mind, Tippingpoint, TopLayer, Radware, NAI Intrushield, Netscreen IDP, Reflex Security and even Checkpoint Intrespect all fit this definition. Host IPS: A software shim (firewall) that sits between the kernel and the application. System calls are intercepted and blocked if they are outside the "allow" policy. Much simpler space with only three vendors, Cisco Secure Agent (was Okena), NAI Entercept, and Sana Security. A start up called Araksha is also looking at this space but they go much deeper into the application at run time. The firewall vendors are excited by IPS because it is a product that can be deployed deep inside a network. Initial traction is being gained at public universities, mostly in the US where there is an objection to firewalls based on "academic freedom". Some of the network IPS vendors are profiting from the need to throttle undesirable traffic (file sharing) at universities. Best, -Richard Stiennon -----Original Message----- From: firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com]On Behalf Of Ben Nagy Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 9:06 AM To: firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com Subject: RE: IPS (was: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?) Can I just jump in and ask what _exactly_ people think "IPS" means? I know I'm asking for a definition debate and we've all seen a bunch of those over the years, but I'm concerned that the "buzzword" factor has lead to compression in terms of vocab. I don't see the basic "attach an IDS to a firewall and have the firewall do stuff based on signatures" concept as amazingly useful (my personal opinion). However lots of companies are producing stuff which they are also calling IPS (us included; consider that a disclaimer). Intrusion Prevention can be done at a number of places 1. The Firewall 2. The Network (inline IPS lives here) 3. The Host (cross platform issues here!) - 3a. The Host Network level (TDI or driver stuff, where the current PFWs live) - 3b. The Host Kernel / Memory Mangement level (systrace, pax, and their windows friends) Of those places, we can work on 1. Attack Signatures (easy to evade, prone to false positives, reactive) 2. Anomaly detection (statistical stuff, less configuration, foolable) 3. Rule Based (hard to program, slower, better suited to a host model) 4. Traffic / rate based. There is a lot of technical depth to the pros and cons of each approach [1]. My own opinion is that the problem of malware, worms and the newer attack vectors (VPN, wireless, laptops etc) pretty much makes it pointless to focus too much on FW based IPS. Basically, firewalls are perimeter based, have huge problems coping with threats that are above the network level, and it's always going to be hard work to stretch their capacities. Witness the profound marketing and technical failure of the proxy firewall, for example. (ok, maybe that sounds like a troll. ;) However, even the crappiest personal firewall has a reasonable chance to contain malware by using application firewalling (this app can bind ports this one can't). The ways that is being approached today is pretty primitive, and there is a lot of work to do - yes - but it's a start. I see future potentiallllllll in an anomaly based approach which can really step in at the network level - buuut... Anyways, I'll restrict the rant, but the point is that it's an overused term, it's Gartnerised, but it's genuinely interesting. I'd love to hear some of your opinions about the viability of the various approaches - because it's fairly clear that we need _some_ new approach. ben [1] European readers with too much time on their hands could come and hear me waffle about this at Infosecurity Europe. Those of you out there who know more about this than I do are welcome to clue me up in advance. ;)
-----Original Message----- From: firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com] On Behalf Of Don Parker Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 12:00 AM To: Marcus J. Ranum; Wes Noonan; 'Baumann, Sean C.'; 'R. DuFresne' Cc: 'Paul Robertson'; firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs? Yes indeed IPS is an excellent technology that is slowly maturing. There is still nothing wrong with the IDS though.
[...]
On Feb 23, "Marcus J. Ranum" <mjr () ranum com> wrote: Wes Noonan wrote:IPS would be a no brainer for me in this scenario.I. Hate. To. Admit. It. But. You. May. Be Right. IPS hype aside, and ignoring what the Gartner idiots think, there's a conceptual value to the IPS concept. Basically, a firewall implements one of 2 policies: - Permit - Deny IPS (i.e.: a signature-based firewall) adds a third option to the policy matrix: - Permit - Deny - Permit it as long as it is not obviously abusive (e.g.: signature hasn't fired)
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Current thread:
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Stiennon,Richard (Feb 26)
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Christopher Lee (Feb 27)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Marcus J. Ranum (Feb 26)
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Paul Robertson (Feb 26)
- Re: IPS Gary Flynn (Feb 26)
- Re: Re: IPS David Thiel (Feb 26)
- Re: Re: IPS Gary Flynn (Feb 27)
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Ben Nagy (Feb 27)
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Chris Blask (Feb 27)
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Marcus J. Ranum (Feb 26)
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Paul Robertson (Feb 26)
- Re: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Gary Flynn (Feb 27)
- RE: IPS (was: Sources for Extranet Designs?) Paul Robertson (Feb 26)