Firewall Wizards mailing list archives

RE: Firewall Rules for NT Server and PDC


From: "Benjamin P. Grubin" <bgrubin () pobox com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2001 21:50:19 -0400

I would never try and convince anyone that NBT or windows networking is safe
to pass through a firewall, but this example is bogus.  psexec does nothing
sexy, it is equivalent to rexec on the un*x platform, which has existed for
eons.  In order to make use of a tool like this, a trust relationship would
have to be exploited.  Allowing this trust relationship to exist between
something like an IIS web server in a DMZ to a PDC, member server, or
workstation on a LAN is the *real* security issue, not the existence of
tools like psexec OR allowing NBT through a firewall.

Compromising a domain member server SHOULD NOT compromise your domain.  When
dealing with a DMZ environment that requires domain connectivity, the trust
relationships should be carefully considered.  The optimal way to do this
(imho) is to have a DMZ PDC, which is seperate from the LAN domain.
Carefully architecting the appropriate trust relationships with the user
domain should be straightforward (if you need them at all).

Remember, firewalls are not the complete solution.  Proper security practice
dictates that you must evaluate the trusts and the application
interconnectivity between each security zone in your network and ensure that
they can not be used to exploit each other to cross those zones, regardless
of infrastructure connectivity.

Cheers,
Ben

----
Benjamin P. Grubin                      bgrubin () pobox com
PGP Fingerprint: EDE9 A88F 3BCC 514A  F310 FEFB 7109 2380

-----Original Message-----
From: firewall-wizards-admin () nfr com
[mailto:firewall-wizards-admin () nfr com]On Behalf Of Dawes, Rogan (ZA -
Johannesburg)
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2001 2:21 AM
To: 'Bjørnar B. Larsen'; 'Ernest Opoku-Agyemang'
Cc: 'firewall-wizards () nfr com'
Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] Firewall Rules for NT Server and PDC


I saw a tool fairly recently called "psexec", which is able to execute
arbitrary commands via nbt services.

For this reason, I (where I have the say-so) refuse to allow
NBT through a
firewall.

The example that scares me immediately is:

psexec \\computer cmd.exe

Instant telnet, if the account on one PC is permitted to
access the other
computer. Otherwise, start guessing passwords.

Rogan

C:\>psexec

PsExec v1.11 - execute processes remotely
Copyright (C) 2001 Mark Russinovich
www.sysinternals.com

PsExec executes a program on a remote system, where remotely executed
console
applications execute interactively.

Usage: psexec \\computer [-u user [-p psswd]] [-s] [-c] [-d] program
[arguments]

     -u         Specifies optional user name for login to remote
                computer.
     -p         Specifies optional password for user name. If
you omit this
                you will be prompted to enter a hidden password.
     -s         Run the remote process in the System account.
     -c         Copy the specified program to the remote system for
                execution. If you omit this option the application
                must be in the system path on the remote system.
     -d         Don't wait for process to terminate (non-interactive).
     program    Name of application to execute.
     arguments  Arguments to pass (note that file paths must be
                absolute paths on the target system).

You can enclose applications that have spaces in their name with
quotation marks e.g. psexec \\marklap "c:\long name app.exe".
Input is only passed to the remote system when you press the enter
key, and typing Ctrl-C terminates the remote process.

If you omit a user name the process will run in the context of your
account on the remote system, but will not have access to network
resources (because it is impersonating). Specify a valid user name
in the Domain\User syntax if the remote process requires access
to network resources or to run in a different account. Note that
the password is transmitted in clear text to the remote system.


C:\>

-----Original Message-----
From: Bjørnar B. Larsen [mailto:Bjornar.B.Larsen () ementor no]
Sent: 05 July 2001 07:30
To: 'Ernest Opoku-Agyemang'
Cc: 'firewall-wizards () nfr com'
Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] Firewall Rules for NT Server and PDC


"Volker Tanger" <volker.tanger () detewe de> wrote:
The connection NT-webserver and PDC necessarily is symmetrical.
You will probably need to open both tcp & udp 135, 137-139 and
1024+ in both directions with no questions asked.

What you need is to allow udp137, udp138 and tcp139 (often
called the NBT
ports). Open them exclusively between the web-server and the
PDC. There's no
need for the high ports. (Tested with NT4SP6a on both servers.)

But with doing
that you will grant the web server and thus all hackers attacking
it (seen the latest IIS exploits yet?) all access to your
internal system(s).

Assuming the web server is on its own interface in the
firewall like this

    INET---FW---WEB
            |
            |
           LAN

and assuming you've made sure nothing but HTTP(S) can reach your
web-server(s) from the Internet:

Attackers need to gain control over the web-server by cracking the
web-service through HTTP, then crack the PDC through NBT (typically
password-cracking or -sniffing). That's when they're finally
in and can do
everything imaginable to your internal net.

You obviously want to make sure both the PDC and the
web-server are locked
down tight and patched, and that the developers of your
webserver make their
scripts/appliations secure.

:) Bjørnar
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