Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
Re: dmz question
From: George Capehart <capegeo () opengroup org>
Date: Sun, 05 Nov 2000 18:30:21 -0500
Hi Martin, In situations when it is necessary to do transactions against legacy data stores, we've partitioned the DMZ into layers with firewalls between each layer and then, when necessary, used mutually authenticated SSL connections through the inside firewall to internal databases and transaction: INTERNET | | V Filtering router | | V Outside Firewall (Outside boundary of DMZ) | | V PRESENTATION LAYER (httpd; static pages only and those in the DCE DFS) | | V Firewall | | V APPLICATION LAYER (CGI, servlets, etc. that implement business logic and construct dynamic pages) | | V Firewall | | V DATA ACCESS LAYER (Operational Data Store, static data, servlets that access back-end transactions) | | V Inside Firewall (Inside boundary of the DMZ {the DMZ needs to be protected from INSIDERS, too, you see. :-) } | | V Internal network Depending upon the complexity of what is implemented in the different layers, the firewalls can be implemented as application proxies or packet filtering firewalls. In this case, the proxies would have to be home-grown. They're sometimes very useful, though, because they can do some logging and, when run in paranoid mode, can even be honey-pots . . . ;-> FWIW, Yet Another Way To Skin The Cat "Ferrari, Martín" wrote:
Hi guys, I have the following architecture: INTERNET - FIREWALL - DMZ - FIREWALL - INTERNAL NETWORK I can't decide whether to put my application server inside the DMZ or inside the internal network. The app server will serve all secure content and has access to the DB server. If I put the app server inside the DMZ zone and someone breaks into the DMZ, s/he can have access to my App Server, and besides that, I have to open a firewall path to my backend database from the DMZ. If I put the app server inside the internal network, I have to open ports for the web server to communicate with it, and if someone breaks into the app server, s/he will have access to the DB machine. Obviously, each machine is itself secured as best as possible. I'd like to have the best possible security scheme so that secure content cannot be accessed in case someone breaks in. Does what I've said make any sense? Are there other considerations to take into account? Thank you very much. Martín _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () nfr com http://www.nfr.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
-- George W. Capehart phone: +1 (704) 277-4561 fax: +1 (704) 853-2624 "I'd rather have a bottle in front of me than a frontal lobotomy." Anonymous _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () nfr com http://www.nfr.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Current thread:
- dmz question Ferrari, Martín (Nov 05)
- Re: dmz question George Capehart (Nov 08)
- Re: dmz question Balázs Nagy (Nov 08)
- Re: dmz question Joe Dauncey (Nov 09)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: dmz question Behm, Jeffrey L. (Nov 06)