RE: DMZ or not ?

["Mike Coppage" <coppagm () nationwide com>]

I'm not an expert, but here's my simple look at how this risk stacks up.  If
you put your DMZ off a NIC on the firewall, then you have to really worry
about your internal connections back into your network.  If you have none,
then the risk is really no different than if you used the more traditional
DMZ.   However, making this assumption is not realistic in today's business
environment, so you will have connections back into the internal network in
some form or other.  This means that somehow you must protect these
connections and the machines behind them.  If you don't then your risk would
essentially be the same as if you removed your firewall from the equation
and just relied on the head-end router for protection.  In a traditional DMZ
you would have the firewall to offer some protection to your internal
application/DBMS servers while your servers in the DMZ act as sacrifices.

Somebody please flame me if I'm wrong about this.


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-firewall-wizards () lists nfr net
[mailto:owner-firewall-wizards () lists nfr net]On Behalf Of Moore, James
Sent: Friday, October 08, 1999 6:53 PM
To: Thomas Crowe; fgb () domain com br; firewall-wizards () nfr net
Subject: RE: DMZ or not ?


Could someone expand on this advice, and list/explain the additional risks
assumed by operating between the router and firewall (as opposed to
operating off a third firewall interface)?

James Moore

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Thomas Crowe [SMTP:thomas.crowe () bellsouth net]
> Sent: Friday, October 08, 1999 7:29 AM
> To:   fgb () domain com br; firewall-wizards () nfr net
> Subject:      RE: DMZ or not  ?
>
> That depends a lot on what definition of a DMZ your using!  If you mean
> the
> classical definition of a DMZ i.e. in between the router and the firewall
> *unprotected* except by router acl's, then my advice would be, don't do
> it,
> not under any circumstances! (ok maybe one or two circumstances).  If your
> referring to the somewhat more contemporary definition of a DMZ i.e.
> another
> interface off your firewall, where as all traffic must still traverse the
> firewall, then I would say go for it, that way *when* your public machines
> get hacked your internal network is still protected, this is good; very
> good
> :-).  NAT is a good thing but it is security through obscurity which isn't
> very secure in and of itself.  Just my $0.02
>
> Thomas Crowe
> Production Network Systems Administrator
> BellSouth Online
> 678-441-7454
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-firewall-wizards () lists nfr net
> > [mailto:owner-firewall-wizards () lists nfr net]On Behalf Of
> > fgb () domain com br
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 1999 9:57 AM
> > To: firewall-wizards () nfr net
> > Subject: DMZ or not ?
> >
> >
> > Hello wizards,
> >
> > Divergences are occurring here im my officce about the use of a
> > DMZ, and I hope the wizards will give me some explanations and/or
> > secure informations about the better
> > implementation.
> >
> > Currently, we're using Linux as a Firewall Box, with a port
> > forwarding to our mail server, that is behind the firewall.
> >
> > We are in way now, to install a public web server and a DNS
> > server. What are de advantages and disadvantages of placing this
> > servers behind the firewall and perform
> > NAT or Port forwarding, instead of  using a DMZ ?
> >
> > Which of the options shoud I implement here in my officce, to
> > have a secure site ?
> >
> > Thanks and regards,
> >
> > Fábio Baptista
> > fgb () domain com br