Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem
From: Bennett Todd <bet () rahul net>
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 1997 06:58:04 -0700
On Mon, Sep 29, 1997 at 12:06:50PM +1000, Darren Reed wrote:
It would seem that the "ultimate" firewall is one in which you can safely and accurately emulate the backend handling of some data, observe what happens as a result of that handling and then decide what to do with it.
I dunno; I'm not sure that's implementable in practice, and I am sure that it would leave us with the same problem we have now, namely trying to keep up with the cleverness of potential attackers. I think something that's closer to implementable, and that may just give us the boost we need to last for another decade or two, will be a richer security infrastructure. There's a basic concept out there, for which I don't have a good name; it lies underneath the Mandatory Access Control notions of the rainbow book series, and TIS's Domain Type Enforcement. It also lies behind the dataflow security implementation in Perl. The idea is to ``tag'' data with a security level, and provide a mechanism for guaranteeing that such tagged data isn't allowed where it shouldn't be. In particular, I envision OSes including support for this extended to a fairly strong networking underpinnings (perhaps using security features like the recent IP work). As a for instance, you could run the latest steaming heap of bits from Netscape or Microsoft, and you'd naturally install them with an explicit trust level of Zero, or perhaps Negative:-). They could interact with the internet, but would basically lie in a highly restricted box; only restricted, tightly controlled interactions would be allowed with anything else inside the security perimeter. Right now we can achieve the same end by restricting such horrid software to the outside of the firewall, running on sacrificial machines in the DMZ accessed via encrypted tunnel; I do this with ssh through plug-gw. But as the application mix gets richer this will be harder to sustain. Happily I'm seeing signs of work in the Real World making use of these kinds of technologies; that's the encouragement they need to really take off. Specifically I got a real thrill when I read the design paper on PCASSO available from <URL:http://medicine.ucsd.edu/pcasso/index.htm>. -Bennett
Current thread:
- firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Marcus J. Ranum (Sep 28)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Paul D. Robertson (Sep 28)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Jyri Kaljundi (Sep 29)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Aleph One (Sep 28)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem neil d. quiogue (Sep 29)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Aleph One (Sep 30)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem neil d. quiogue (Sep 29)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Darren Reed (Sep 28)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Bennett Todd (Sep 29)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Leonard Miyata (Sep 30)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Anton J Aylward (Sep 28)
- Firewall administration. Darren Reed (Sep 29)
- Re: Firewall administration. Bennett Todd (Sep 30)
- Firewall administration. Darren Reed (Sep 29)
- RE: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Itai Dor-on (Sep 28)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Bennett Todd (Sep 29)
- RE: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Dana Nowell (Sep 29)
- Re: firewalls and the incoming traffic problem Paul D. Robertson (Sep 28)