Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives

Re: Fwd: URGENT: bot net with keylogger


From: "T. Charles Yun" <tcyun () INTERNET2 EDU>
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2004 14:29:33 -0400

Doug,

not sure if you saw, but we are encouraging people to sign up for the
educause security list and will be taking down wg-security () internet2 edu
in 30 days.


- tcy



Doug Pearson wrote:
redirecting with permission...


Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2004 10:05:09 -0400 (EDT)
From: Kathy Bergsma <kathya () nersp nerdc ufl edu>
To: Doug Pearson <dodpears () indiana edu>
Cc: security () switch ch, wg-security () internet2 edu
Subject: Re: Fwd: URGENT: bot net with keylogger

Yesterday, our flow data showed attempts from compromised system to connect to
port 8040 on the following addresses.  We are still logging attempts to the
gatech address today.  These systems were all blocked remotely and we block port
8040 locally, but our flow data still logs the attempts.  Since
et.bestexploiters.com no longer resolves, the intruder must be using a new
domain.  I'll see if I can learn the new domain from a sniff today.

128.61.164.122 hin-128-61-164-122.hinman.gatech.edu
129.244.129.84 <?>.utulsa.edu
129.244.30.149 <?>.utulsa.edu
203.71.132.210 <?>.ksut.edu.tw

On some, but not all systems, we found a file called keylog.txt in
c:\windows\system32.  We found a rootkit installed in CAROOT on one system.
The system had multiple infections and our forensics aren't complete, so we're
not sure if it was related to bestexploiters.

All compromises on our network were restricted to private IP that is protected
with the established option, so my best guess for mode of compromise is that the
users visited a malicious website with a vulnerable IE browser.  Most of the
compromised systems were from Sorority houses.  All but one were female.  A
Google search of bestexploiters produces some (now dead) pornography links.

Anyone else have any useful forensics?

=============
Kathy Bergsma
UF Information Security Manager
352-392-2061

On Tue, 6 Apr 2004, Doug Pearson wrote:


Working with Internet2 Abilene engineers and management we chose to apply
filters in the Abilene network to block traffic between Abilene and the botnet
IRCD servers. Owners of the respective networks have been contacted regarding
the action. At the time, all 15 known IRCD servers were at .edu's, both within
and outside the U.S., and all reachable via Abilene. The traffic blocks act as
blackholes - the traffic from Abilene connected hosts to the IRCDs will not
reroute over the commercial Internet. The filters were applied ~11:50p CDT. At
~00:15a CDT, et.bestexploters.com now resolves to a single host at 1.3.3.7.
That's an "IANA Reserved" network, not sure if there's a workable IRCD there
or not.

- Doug Pearson



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To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU, wg-security () internet2 edu
From: REN-ISAC <dodpears () indiana edu>
Subject: URGENT: bot net with keylogger
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Dear all,

Security engineers at Indiana University have been involved in local
discovery and investigation with others regarding a rapidly growing and
particularly threatening bot network. Of URGENT CONCERN is that the client
contains a keystroke logger. All keystrokes on the compromised machines are
transmitted to a controlling IRCD. We've been able to observe traffic to one
of at least 15 controlling IRCDs. That one IRCD was in control of over 12,000
clients. On the face, it appears that the network grew to that size in much
less than one day, and 12,000 may represent just 1/15th of the network. We're
in process of collaborating with other groups in analysis. There's no
information to share regarding infection vector just yet. In the meantime, a
useful and highly recommended response is for institutions to immediately
locally block the DNS name that clients use to contact the IRCDs:
et.bestexploiters.com. If you're able to log DNS requests you should be able
to identify local compromised hosts. The REN-ISAC will be directly contacting
the institutions home to observed compromised machines, and will provide
host-specific information.

Regards,

Doug Pearson
Director, REN-ISAC
http://www.ren-isac.net
+1-812-855-3846
+1-812-325-3846 cell

--

Doug Pearson; Indiana University; dodpears () indiana edu
Phone: 812-855-3846; ViDeNet: 0018128553846
PGP: http://mypage.iu.edu/~dodpears/dodpears_pubkey.asc




--

Doug Pearson; Indiana University; dodpears () indiana edu
Phone: 812-855-3846; ViDeNet: 0018128553846
PGP: http://mypage.iu.edu/~dodpears/dodpears_pubkey.asc

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--
- Charles
===========================================================
 T. Charles Yun, Program Manager
 Internet2                              cell: 734.730.3300
 3025 Boardwalk                          fax: 734.913.4255
 Suite 100                      email: tcyun () internet2 edu
 Ann Arbor, Michigan          yahoo, msn, aim: tcharlesyun
 48108                         http://internet2.edu/~tcyun

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