BreachExchange mailing list archives

Judge applies common sense to question of what constitutes a data breach


From: Audrey McNeil <audrey () riskbasedsecurity com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 13:46:46 -0700

http://www.techworld.com.au/article/589959/judge-applies-common-sense-question-what-constitutes-data-breach/?fp=16&fpid=1


Enterprise security is a frustrating game, because IT winning 99.9% of the
time isn’t enough. One lucky cyberthief or one careless employee —
something completely beyond your control — can cause a data breach, a
failure that will stay on your résumé forever. But a small dose of sanity
emerged on Nov. 13 when a federal judge ruled that a data breach needs to
have actual victims, not merely hypothetical ones.

The ruling, by D. Michael Chappell, the chief administrative law judge for
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), threw out an FTC complaint against
a cancer research lab called LabMD. The matter involved a LabMD employee
who violated company policies and downloaded P2P software, inadvertently
exposing sensitive patient information on a file-sharing network. The
breach, however, was detected and shut down before anyone on the outside
saw that information, and no one ever accessed the sensitive data.

This case gets as close as any to the famed philosophy question, “If a tree
falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?”
Is it really a data breach if no unauthorized person ever sees or accesses
the protected data?

It’s not that easy a question. Let’s say you’re in charge of building
operations/facilities management and one of your security guards is
supposed to make sure that every door in the building is locked as of a
certain time at night. You check one night and find the door to your CEO’s
office unlocked. You then establish that the security guard simply forgot.
Should the guard be disciplined, perhaps even fired? Does it make a
difference if no one actually entered the CEO’s office during the breach?
For many people, the fact that someone could have strolled into the CEO’s
office quite easily is reason enough to come down hard on the security
guard.

“The burden was on Complaint Counsel to prove, initially, that Respondent’s
alleged failure to employ ‘reasonable and appropriate’ data security
‘caused, or is likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers,’ as
alleged in the Complaint,” the judge wrote in his decision. “The evidence
presented in this case fails to prove these allegations. There is no
evidence that any consumer has suffered any substantial injury as a result
of Respondent’s alleged conduct, and both the quality and quantity of
Complaint Counsel’s evidence submitted to prove that such injury is,
nevertheless, ‘likely’ is unpersuasive.”

The judge also knocked down an FTC argument that the employee’s P2P mishap
meant that a future data breach was likely. “The theory that there is a
likelihood of substantial injury for all consumers whose information is
maintained on Respondent’s computer networks because there is a ‘risk’ of a
future data breach is without merit because the evidence presented fails to
demonstrate a likelihood that Respondent’s computer network will be
breached in the future and cause substantial consumer injury. While there
may be proof of possible consumer harm, the evidence fails to demonstrate
probable, i.e., likely, substantial consumer injury.”

This ruling seems like common sense, something that is sadly rare. And it
provides some important takeaways. It means that if you detect a breach and
close it before data is actually seen by anyone, you should avoid FTC
penalties. And given the respect federal judges tend to give to the
opinions of other federal judges, this could have consequences far beyond
FTC rulings.

It won’t help with civil lawsuits, though, where anything that a party can
allege is fair game so long as a judge doesn’t throw it out. But it will
help with administrative headaches.

We need to split security holes into three categories, with their own rules
and implications. First are holes that are deliberately opened by a
cyberthief, to be used now or at some point in the future. Second are holes
that are unintentionally opened by authorized employees or contractors, as
in the LabMD case. Third are holes that exist because of an intentional but
non-malicious vendor effort (such as creating a back door for maintenance
or the use of a default password by a sloppy IT administrator).

Under scenario one (hole opened by bad guy), it’s almost impossible to make
a strong argument that data was never at risk. Cyberthieves are good at
hiding their tracks and placing misleading bogus clues in activity logs. If
you believe a cyberthief has been in your system, you need to assume bad
things happened. You can’t successfully argue hypothetical damage in those
cases.

Under scenario two (employee accident), a quick response can save the day,
as LabMd just discovered.

Under scenario three (vendor’s non-malicious hole), things get complicated.
If the FTC or some similar agency wants to argue hypothetical damage,
duration and knowledge become key factors. How long did the back door exist
on your system? And how long was it there after your team learned of it?

This gets complicated because you could still be in trouble even if these
answers are all in your favor. Let’s say that your vendor never told you
about this back door and your people didn’t learn of it until bad guys
broke in and did serious damage. It feels like you’re blameless, but your
people did retain that vendor and install that company’s software. You can
— and certainly should — sue that vendor, but that won’t stop your team
from getting blamed and sued, too.

But at least Judge Chappell has left you in a better position than you were
in before.
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