Dailydave mailing list archives

Re: Longer form questions


From: Anton Chuvakin <anton () chuvakin org>
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 16:15:15 -0700

Wow, indeed, so 2007, this brings back memories ....

But on a more serious note: do you guys truly think that network security
monitoring (whether NIDS, network forensics / capture, "NTA / NDR", Bro /
Zeek and such) is "dead dead"? And there no hope for any
zombie-apocalypse-style revival? :-)

On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 2:41 PM Chris Rohlf <chris.rohlf () gmail com> wrote:

I’ve been happily ignoring Twitter the last few weeks so when I saw a DD
post come in I got excited and felt nostalgic for 2007, which
coincidentally this thread reminds me of. Not just because Dave is trolling
Rob but also because I thought the idea of network based protocol and file
parsers died around that time. How many HTTP implementation quirks does the
Snort engine implement these days? Back then it was almost none. But what
about now? Trick question, it doesn’t matter.

Theres not enough memory or cpu in your average NIDS (or whatever they’re
called now) to possibly keep state while monitoring the traffic volume in
any real production deployment.

I suppose theres only one RDP implementation whose quirks are worth
reimplementing, but what are the chances they did it better than Microsoft?
Does the MITM have as many mitigations as a modern Msft server OS? And are
you willing to trust it with all those private keys? Does the MITM box have
2fa auth? Role based acl’s? What other disk did that key touch after your
team exported it? If you’re a CISO who is losing sleep over these exploits
but are not asking the questions above then you may not have your
priorities straight.

Chris

On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 11:03 AM Dave Aitel <dave.aitel () gmail com> wrote:


https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/09/the-latest-on-bluekeep-and-dejablue.html

Ok, so as someone pointed out in private email, they have a blog that
goes through a 20 step process to exporting your private key from your RDP
server to the MITM box that is parsing the protocol. I think this is an
unlikely configuration, but in theory it IS possible. An anomaly detection
algorithm might be a better option for real world detection, even though it
is not specific to the bug.

In other words, just to annoy Rob Graham, maybe network defenses can't
really find every bug they want to - not just because they should not be
edge-devices with vast repositories of every private key on your network,
but because parsing requires state and state requires memory and you don't
have infinite memory.

https://vimeo.com/357848836 <---also watch the INFILTRATE teaser! :)

ALSO: I'm headed to Tel Aviv next week if there's any infosec stuff
happening there and anyone wants to say hi!

-dave







On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 12:57 PM Dave Aitel <dave.aitel () gmail com> wrote:

So I like the BLUEKEEP marketing train because it's a very hard bug to
detect authoritatively for either endpoint protection or for network-based
defenses. So when companies make claims about it, it's worth asking how
they did that. Twitter is a terrible place for that, but since I know
everyone in the industry who does this kind of thing is on this list I
figured I'd ask here...

-dave


https://twitter.com/daveaitel/status/1169265348669005825

[image: image.png]

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-- 
Dr. Anton Chuvakin
Site: http://www.chuvakin.org
Twitter: @anton_chuvakin
Work: http://www.linkedin.com/in/chuvakin
Blog: https://blogs.gartner.com/anton-chuvakin/

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