Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure

["Stefan Kanthak" <stefan.kanthak () nexgo de>]

"Reindl Harald" <h.reindl () thelounge net> wrote:

> Am 10.08.2013 16:52, schrieb Tobias Kreidl:
> > It is for this specific reason that utilities like suPHP can be used as a powerful tool to at least keep the
> > account user from shooting anyone but him/herself in the foot because of any configuration or broken security
> > issues. Allowing suexec to anyone but a seasoned, responsible admin is IMO a recipe for disaster.
>
> and what makes you believe that a developer can not be a "seasoned, responsible admin"?

Because developers write functions like "system", "symlink" and "suexec"
which can create havoc (and are WELL-KNOWN for creating havoc since
years) and allow everybody to call them in the default configuration of
their software.

> bullshit, many of the "seasoned, responsible admins" which are only
> admins are unable to really understand the implications of whatever
> config they rollout

It was the developer who created and published this vulnerable software
or the vulnerable default configuration in the first place.

If a user/administrator who installs software has to turn insecure
features OFF its the developer who is to blame, and of course the
testers, the QA and the management too.

Stefan Kanthak