[TKADV2008-010] VLC media player TiVo ty Processing Stack Overflow Vulnerability

[Tobias Klein <tk () trapkit de>]

Please find attached a detailed advisory of the vulnerability.

Alternatively, the advisory can also be found at:
http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/TKADV2008-010.txt

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Advisory:               VLC media player TiVo ty Processing Stack Overflow 
                        Vulnerability
Advisory ID:            TKADV2008-010
Revision:               1.0              
Release Date:           2008/10/20 
Last Modified:          2008/10/20 
Date Reported:          2008/10/18
Author:                 Tobias Klein (tk at trapkit.de)
Affected Software:      VLC media player <= 0.9.4
Remotely Exploitable:   Yes
Locally Exploitable:    No 
Vendor URL:             http://www.videolan.org/ 
Vendor Status:          Vendor has released an updated version       
Patch development time: 1 day

                    
======================
Vulnerability details: 
======================

The VLC media player contains a stack overflow vulnerability while parsing
malformed TiVo ty media files. The vulnerability can be trivially exploited
by a (remote) attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of VLC 
media player.


==================
Technical Details:
==================

Source code file: modules\demux\Ty.c

[...]
1623    static void parse_master(demux_t *p_demux)
1624    {
1625      demux_sys_t *p_sys = p_demux->p_sys;
1626      uint8_t mst_buf[32];  <-- [1]
1627      int i, i_map_size;
1628      int64_t i_save_pos = stream_Tell(p_demux->s);
1629      int64_t i_pts_secs;
1630    
1631      /* Note that the entries in the SEQ table in the stream may have
1632         different sizes depending on the bits per entry.  We store them
1633         all in the same size structure, so we have to parse them out one
1634         by one.  If we had a dynamic structure, we could simply read the
1635         entire table directly from the stream into memory in place. */
1636    
1637      /* clear the SEQ table */
1638      free(p_sys->seq_table);
1639        
1640      /* parse header info */
1641      stream_Read(p_demux->s, mst_buf, 32);  <-- [2]
1642      i_map_size = U32_AT(&mst_buf[20]);  <-- [3]
1643      p_sys->i_bits_per_seq_entry = i_map_size * 8;
1644      i = U32_AT(&mst_buf[28]);   /* size of SEQ table, in bytes */
1645      p_sys->i_seq_table_size = i / (8 + i_map_size);
1646    
1647      /* parse all the entries */
1648      p_sys->seq_table = malloc(p_sys->i_seq_table_size * 
                                  sizeof(ty_seq_table_t));
1649      for (i=0; i<p_sys->i_seq_table_size; i++) {
1650          stream_Read(p_demux->s, mst_buf, 8 + i_map_size);  <-- [4]
[...]

[1] This stack buffer can be overflowed
[2] 32 bytes of user controlled file data are copied into "mst_buf"
[3] "i_map_size" is extracted from the user controlled file data 
[4] The user controlled value of "i_map_size" is used as a length value 
    for the "stream_Read()" function. This function copies "i_map_size" 
    bytes of file data (that can also be controlled by the attacker) into 
    the stack buffer "mst_buf". This leads to a straight stack overflow 
    that can be trivially exploited by a (remote) attacker to execute 
    arbitrary code in the context of VLC.


========= 
Solution: 
=========

  See "Workarounds" and "Solution" sections of the VideoLAN-SA-0809 [1].


======== 
History: 
========

  2008/10/18 - Vendor notified
  2008/10/18 - Patch developed 
  2008/10/20 - Public disclosure of vulnerability details by the vendor
  2008/10/20 - Release date of this security advisory


======== 
Credits: 
========

  Vulnerability found and advisory written by Tobias Klein.


=========== 
References: 
===========

 [1] http://www.videolan.org/security/sa0809.html
 [2] http://git.videolan.org/?p=vlc.git;a=commitdiff;h=26d92b87bba99b5ea2
     e17b7eaa39c462d65e9133
 [3] http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/TKADV2008-010.txt


======== 
Changes: 
========

  Revision 0.1 - Initial draft release to the vendor
  Revision 1.0 - Public release
  

===========
Disclaimer:
===========

The information within this advisory may change without notice. Use
of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS
condition. There are no warranties, implied or express, with regard
to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any
direct or indirect damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection
with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this
information is at the user's own risk.


================== 
PGP Signature Key: 
==================

  http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/tk-advisories-signature-key.asc

  
Copyright 2008 Tobias Klein. All rights reserved.

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