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Re: iDefense Security Advisory 04.30.07: Cerulean Studios Trillian Multiple IRC Vulnerabilities


From: Reversemode <advisories () reversemode com>
Date: Fri, 04 May 2007 21:28:22 +0200


Hi,

You are right Marvin.  There is a lot more behind the scenes.
There is a funny flaw in the way Trillian handles certain UTF series in
the Talk Window, so the flaw affects almost every protocol supported by
Trillian.

Summing up the problem:

Trillian (talk module) allocates a fixed amount of heap memory for
storing a line which, after being parsed, will be displayed on the talk
Box. The size reserved is determined by the width of the window
(GetClientRect) where you are chatting.

This reasoning is valid if you think in  "visible" characters and the
width in a ratio such as "1:4",I mean one ascii character will always
need a bounding box (x:y)  greater than 1x1 to fit onto, i.e at least 4x4.
Thus, a buffer of 200 bytes is always enough (Rect.width = 200) for
copying  a line of ascii characters without having to calculate how many
bytes we really need. This is the idea (more or less). Not very secure
but works so everything ok.

However, this assumption becomes a potential (real indeed) risk while
handling UTF series. In terms of "visible" characters you could reduce (
or expand ) a specially crafted UTF string of three hundred bytes to
just a few "visible" characters  displayed on the box. Moreover, if the
parser is, say, "weak", you get a remote heap overflow screaming "Hey!
I'm here! don't you see me?".

I'm not the original discoverer of this flaw, just some time ago a
person came up requesting my opinion about why Trillian was crashing and
well,you know...


Cheers,
Rubén.

------------
Reversemode
Advanced Reverse Engineering Services
www.reversemode.com

Marvin Frick wrote:
Hi there,

this is my first mail to a mail list at all and additionally my
English is not as perfect as it should be... i know.

I verified this overflow vulnerability and found some interesting
facts coming along with that.
If you try to copy a very very long URL to a conversation window (ICQ
and MSN  work as well as IRC) the application will end up in a denial
of service situation.

iDefense Labs only reported their issue only to the IRC module but I
think this should work with all the other modules too.


greetings from Germany,
Marvin Frick

iDefense Labs wrote:
Cerulean Studios Trillian Multiple IRC Vulnerabilities

iDefense Security Advisory 04.30.07
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Apr 30, 2007

I. BACKGROUND

Cerulean Studios Trillian is a multi-protocol chat application that
supports IRC, ICQ, AIM and MSN protocols. More information can be found
on the vendor's site at the following URL.

http://www.ceruleanstudios.com/learn/

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities in the Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) module of Cerulean Studios' Trillian could allow for the
interception of private conversations or execution of code as the
currently logged on user.

When handling long CTCP PING messages containing UTF-8 characters, it is
possible to cause the Trillian IRC client to return a malformed response
to the server. This malformed response is truncated and is missing the
terminating newline character. This could allow the next line sent to
the server to be improperly sent to an attacker.

When a user highlights a URL in an IRC message window Trillian copies
the data to an internal buffer. If the URL contains a long string of
UTF-8 characters, it is possible to overflow a heap based buffer
corrupting memory in a way that could allow for code execution.

A heap overflow can be triggered remotely when the Trillian IRC module
receives a message that contains a font face HTML tag with the face
attribute set to a long UTF-8 string.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability allows remote attackers to intercept
private communications for Trillian IRC users or execute code with the
credentials of the currently logged on user.

In order to exploit the highlighted URL vulnerability, users would have
to highlight the malicious URL.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Cerulean
Studios Trillian 3.1.

V. WORKAROUND

iDefense is currently unaware of any effective workaround for this
issue.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

Cerulean Studios has addressed these vulnerabilities within version
3.1.5.0 of Trillian. For more information, visit their blog at the
following URL.

http://blog.ceruleanstudios.com/

VII. CVE INFORMATION

A Mitre Corp. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number has not
been assigned yet.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

01/24/2007  Initial vendor notification
01/30/2007  Initial vendor response
04/30/2007  Coordinated public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

These vulnerabilities were reported to iDefense by enhalos.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2007 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice () idefense com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.




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