Re: Lotus Notes Stored Form Vulnerability

[Mikkel Heisterberg <m_heisterberg () HOTMAIL COM>]

People administring Lotus Domino should still be aware that the default
settings for the ECL was VERY loose before Lotus Notes release 5.x (e.g.
permitted unsigned code to be run). This means that the suggested
"vunerability" could still be exploited at a site with an improberly
configured Lotus Notes installation.

Mikkel Heisterberg

> From: Felix Grushevsky <fil () VIADUK NET>
> Reply-To: Felix Grushevsky <fil () VIADUK NET>
> To: BUGTRAQ () SECURITYFOCUS COM
> Subject: Re: Lotus Notes Stored Form Vulnerability
> Date: Sat, 10 Feb 2001 05:06:31 +0200
>
> Lotus Notes has a security protection measure called ECL - Execution
> Control List.
> Basically, every executable design element (form, agent, database etc) in
> Lotus Notes has a signature on it. The signature tells Notes about the last
> person who changed this design element.
> The ECL determines whether the signer of the code is allowed to have its
> code run on a given workstation, and defines the extent to which the code
> has access to various workstation functions and is gated by the workstation
> security ECL.
> Basically, in your example you did not have ECL configured - so configure
> it and do your testing again.
>
> see also
> http://www.notes.net/today.nsf/f01245ebfc115aaf8525661a006b86b9/3a9da544637a69b2852568310078b649?OpenDocument
>
> Best Regards,
> Feliks Grushevskiy
>
> Chris Jones <dp () ic-crypt com>@SECURITYFOCUS.COM> on 09.02.2001 18:13:29
>
>
> Please respond to dp () ic-crypt com
> Sent by:  Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ () SECURITYFOCUS COM>
>
> To:  BUGTRAQ () SECURITYFOCUS COM
> cc:
>
>
>
> Subject:  Lotus Notes Stored Form Vulnerability
>
>
>
>
> _________________________________________________________________________
>
>   Security Advisory:     Lotus Notes Stored Form Vulnerability
>   Date:             8th February 2001
>   Author:      Chris Jones (aka dp) dp () ic-crypt com
>   Versions Affected:     At present only Lotus Notes v4.6 has been tested
> _________________________________________________________________________
>
>
> ----[ Exploit Introduction ] ------------------------------------------
> Due to the design flaws of Lotus Notes databases, a user with sufficient
> knowledge can craft a Lotus Notes Email in such a way that the recipient
> only has to open the email or view the email using the preview panes to
> become infected or to run the arbitrary code.
>
> The problem lies in Lotus Notes ability to allow developers to create forms
> that do not rely on a specific template in a database (like normal emails)
> but instead uses its own in built templates that travel within the
> document. Using these methods an experienced Lotus Notes developer could
> create an email enabled worm specifically for Lotus Notes networks. Which
> could do anything from delete a few files to granting ACL rights to the
> persons mail box (so all emails could be viewed) to retrieving the users
> cached passwords or similar information. Another key point that allows this
> exploit to occur is that the design of the mailbox database has by default
> been allowed to accept stored forms.
>
>
> ----[ Exploit Generation ] ---------------------------------------------
> To generate the email a malicious user will need to modify the default
> 'memo' form's design - which does require a developer's edition of Lotus
> Notes. The malicious user then has to modify the forms' properties so the
> 'Store form in Document' action is checked. The malicious user then has a
> choice he could insert code into the forms 'PostOpen' event, which requires
> Lotus Script programming knowledge or he can go the easy method and modify
> the forms 'Launch' properties which allows you to launch the first document
> attachment when opened which could be absolutely anything.
>
>
> ----[ Quick Fix ] ------------------------------------------------------
> There is a very quick and very easy method of disabling this feature and
> that is to modify the mailbox database properties so that the 'Allow stored
> forms' is unchecked. This will stop any forms of this attack.
>
>
> ----[ Platforms Tested ] -----------------------------------------------
> We tested this exploit out using Lotus Notes version 4.6 but any version of
> Lotus Notes 4 should be affected, as I am sure lower and higher versions
> would be as well. In our experiment I was able to gain manager access to
> someone else's Email Box using 4 Lines of Lotus Script code.
>
>
> ----[ Other Notes ] ----------------------------------------------------
> Using Lotus Script you can even change the source address of the email to
> fool the user into believing that the infected email came from a trusted
> source. You could even go so far as to code the email so it looks at the
> target's mailbox and creates a duplicate document of his most recent email,
> so it looks as some other user has sent him two copies of the same email.
>
> _________________________________________________________________________
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> _________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________
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